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NOTES
CAPITAL GAIN TREATMENT OF A SALE OF
COMPUTER SOFTWARE BY A RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
Computers represent an elegant technology. They deserve an
equally elegant treatment at the hands of lawyers. Without it, society
could be deprived of the full benefit of the technology which it re-
quires desperately in order to function at current levels of develop-
ment and population.'
The computer industry continues to grow at an astronomical rate,
despite a lack of software2 that threatened to slow its momentum in the
early 1980s.3 Nevertheless, many corporations still find it difficult to
raise sufficient capital to support software development. With careful
planning, these corporations may be able to use the research and devel-
opment (R & D) limited partnership as an investment vehicle to provide
the needed capital.
The usefulness of this financing approach depends on the availabil-
ity of significant tax benefits to investors. These benefits include deduc-
tions for research and development costs and long-term capital gain
treatment of the sale of the software developed. This Note deals primar-
ily with the latter benefit, arguing that software is "know-how" that can
be held and transferred by an R & D limited partnership in a manner
entitling it to capital gain treatment. The Note analyzes software devel-
oped through an R & D limited partnership arrangement in light of the
1 Freed, Introduction: Will Lawyers Impede Computerization, 30 EMORY L.J. 345, 345
(1981).
2 The term "software" encompasses the programs that direct the operation of a
computer.
Hardware consists of tangible objects-integrated circuits, printed circuit
boards, cables, power supplies, memories, card readers, line printers, and ter-
minals-rather than abstract ideas or instructions.
Software, in contrast, consists of algorithms (detailed instructions telling
how to do something) and their computer representations-namely, pro-
grams. Programs can be represented on punched cards, magnetic tape,
photographic film, and other media, but the essence of software is the set of
instructions that make up the programs, not the physical media on which
they are recorded.
A. TANENBAUM, STRUCTURED COMPUTER ORGANIZATION 10 (1976).
3 Missing Computer Software, Bus. WK., Sept. 1, 1980, at 46 ("The computer revolution is
running into a bottleneck that is beginning to slow its momentum."). The lag existed despite
the growth of independent software companies and foreign developments. Id. at 47, 53. Ma-
jor problems in software development appeared to be shortages of resources, high develop-
ment costs, and an acute programmer shortage. Id at 47-49.
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long-term capital gain treatment of know-how. It argues that the only
significant barriers to granting such treatment are the holding period
requirement of section 12234 and the possibility that the Service and the
courts may characterize the arrangement as a disguised borrowing or a
purchase of a net-profits interest. The Note concludes that a sale of
software by an R & D limited partnership can satisfy all of the require-
ments necessary to qualify for long-term capital gain treatment.
I
THE SOFTWARE MARKET
For years software development has lagged behind the rapidly ad-
vancing computer hardware market.5 Some commentators have argued
that lack of patent protection for software is a major factor retarding the
software industry's growth;6 because the development of computer pro-
grams is both time-consuming and costly, an inventor needs to know in
advance whether he will be able to reap the benefits of his labor. Never-
theless, even though the availability of patent protection remains an un-
settled issue,7 the computer industry has begun to focus on software
4 I.R.C. § 1223 (1976).
5 See supra note 3.
6 Bender, Computer Programs: Should Thy Be Patentable?, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 241, 244-48
(1968); Note, An Anomaly in the Patent System: The Uncertain Status of Computer Software, 8 RUT. J.
COMPUTERS, TECH. & L. 273, 277 (1981). But see Gemignani, Legal Protection for Computer
Software: The Viewfrom '7.9, 7 RUT. J. COMPUTERS, TECH. & L. 269, 309-10 (1980) (arguing
that because software growth has been so phenomenal without patent protection, no further
incentive is needed for continued progress).
7 An increasingly accepted definition of software includes three elements: "(1) the un-
derlying process or algorithm upon which the program is based; (2) the program itself coded
in some programming language; and (3) the supporting documentation including items such
as flow charts, instruction manuals and other materials that explain the operation of the
program." WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, PUB. No. 814-3, MODEL
PROVISIONS ON THE PROTECTION OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE 12 (1978). The debate over
patentability turns on the distinction between the algorithm and the program itself. The
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals uses a two-step analysis:
First, it must be determined whether the claim directly or indirectly recites an
"algorithm" in the Benson sense of that term ["[a] procedure for solving a
given type of mathematical problem" Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65
(1972)], for a claim which fails even to recite an algorithm clearly cannot
wholly preempt an algorithm. Second, the claim must be further analyzed to
ascertain whether in its entirety it wholly preempts that algorithm.
In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1245 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
In a recent Supreme Court case, Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), the Court held
that the use of a computer program to implement an otherwise patentable invention did not
detract from its patentable nature. Although the opinion did not mention the Freeman test,
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has construed Diehr as upholding the Freeman anal-
ysis. See In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 915 (C.C.P.A. 1982) ("[T]he second part of [the Freeman]
test conforms to the opinion of the Supreme Court in Diamond v. Diehr. '9; In re Abele, 684
F.2d 902, 907 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (applying Freeman test post-Diehr). Commentators, however,
disagree over whether Diehr has resolved the issue. Compare Nimtz, Diamond v. Diehr: A
Turning Point, 8 RUT. J. COMPUTERS, TECH. & L. 267, 270 (1981) ("The Supreme Court
decision in the Diehr case has finally resovled a twelve-year-old legal controversy over the
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development. 8 Financing software development has thus become a ma-
jor concern, 9 with the R & D limited partnership providing an attractive
alternative to more traditional methods of financing because of the po-
tential tax benefits it affords investors.
II
THE R & D LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ARRANGEMENT
The heart of the R & D limited partnership arrangement is current
expensing of what would otherwise be considered nondeductible capital
expenditures. Section 174 provides an exception to the general rule that
pre-operating or start-up expenses cannot be deducted under section
162.10 Under section 174 a taxpayer can deduct research and develop-
'patentability of computer programs.' ") with Note, supra note 6, at 302 ("While the Freeman
test has been used by the C.C.P.A. in recent years as a clear indicator of patentability, the
Supreme Court has ignored this standard and applied yet another test of statutory subject
matter in Diehr. ") (footnotes omitted).
Even if the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals is correct in continuing to apply the
Freeman test, the outcome in any particular case is not easy to predict. The dissent in Diehr
emphasizes the confusion existing in this area: "The cases considering the patentability of the
program-related inventions do not establish rules that enable a conscientious patent lawyer to
determine with a fair degree of accuracy which, if any, program-related inventions will be
patentable." Diehr, 450 U.S. at 219 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens suggested an
alternative holding:
(1) ...[N]o program-related invention is a patentable process. . . unless it
makes a contribution to the art that is not dependent entirely on the utiliza-
tion of a computer, and
(2) an unequivocal explanation that the term "algorithm" . . is synony-
mous with the term "computer program."
Id (footnote omitted). See generaly Battaglia & Herskovitz, Organizing a computer software re-
search and development program for top tax advantage, 58 J. TAX'N 92 (1983).
8 Egan, Investing in the Computer Revolution, N.Y. MAO., Sept. 20, 1982, at 28 ("[G]iven
the ready availability of sophisticated computer equipment at relatively modest cost from
numerous manufacturers, the industry's focus today is shifting from equipment to software
.... ); see alro The Incredible Explosion of Start-ups, Bus. Wk., Aug. 2, 1982, at 53 ("[One
computer company] spends 35% of its revenues on marketing and dedicates more than two-
thirds of its development people to software.').
9 This Note assumes that development of software is good for society. One may ques-
tion whether Congress has embraced this policy and to what extent capital gain treatment of
a sale of computer software by an R & D limited partnership promotes the policy. Arguably,
Congress expressed its intent to encourage software development in the Report of the Ways
and Means Committee of the House on the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. The com-
mittee acknowledged that Revenue Procedure 69-21 brought software within the purview of
§ 174 and stated that "expenditures which otherwise would qualify for the new [§ 44F credit
for increasing research activities] are not to be disqualified solely because such costs are in-
curred in developing computer 'software,' rather than in developing 'hardware,'" H.R. REP.
No. 201, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 114 (1981) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]. This may be
as far as Congress wants, or needs, to go. The benefits afforded investors under Revenue
Procedure 69-21 may be significant enough to preclude the need for further encouragement
via the capital gain provisions. Nevertheless, given that a sale of computer software by an R
& D limited partnership can satisfy both the formal and substantive requirements of the
capital gain provisions as they stand, a mere negative implication of congressional intent
should not be enough to deny such treatment.
10 See, e.g., NCNB Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 942 (4th Cir. 1981) (bank must
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ment expenditures incurred "in connection with [its] trade or busi-
ness."" The Supreme Court has held that the "in connection with"
language of section 174 is less restrictive than the "carrying on a trade or
business" language of section 162.12 Thus, a limited partner in a part-
nership organized to develop a marketable product may deduct his
share of research and experimental costs in the year paid, even though
the partnership is not carrying on a trade or business, 13 and even though
another person or organization conducts the research on the partner-
ship's behalf.14
The Service has stated in Revenue Procedure 69-2115 that it will
treat the costs of developing software in a manner similar to that ac-
corded section 174 expenses.' 6 In addition, a taxpayer may treat pay-
capitalize costs of opening branch offices), vacated and aff'd on other ground, 684 F.2d 285 (4th
Cir. 1982) (en banc); Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 633 F.2d 512, 517 (7th Cir.
1980) (holding that start-up costs must be capitalized and rejecting that taxpayer-partner's
partnership venture was expansion of the partners' existing business); Goodwin v. Commis-
sioner, 75 T.C. 424 (1980) (same result where partnerships not engaged in business while
project under construction and before completion; rejecting "aggregate" theory of partner-
ships); cf United States v. Manor Care, 490 F. Supp. 355, 359-62 (D. Md. 1980) (two nursing
homes' pre-operating expenses of type that would recur were deductible).
11 I.R.C. § 174(a)(1) (1976) ("A taxpayer may treat research or experimental expendi-
tures which are paid or incurred by him during the taxable year in connection with his trade
or business as expenses which are not chargeable to capital account. The expenditures so
treated shall be allowed as a deduction.").
12 Snow v. Commissioner, 416 U.S. 500, 502-04 (1974). But see Kilroy v. Commissioner,
41 T.C.M. (CCH) 292, 295 (1980) (citing Snow for the proposition that "[tihe concept of
'trade or business' in section 174 is similar to that in section 162.').
13 Snow v. Commissioner, 416 U.S. 500 (1974).
14 Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(2) (1957); see Snow, 416 U.S. at 502 (outside engineering firm
doing "shopwork"). Such research costs, however, if incurred "in connection with the con-
struction or manufacture of depreciable property by another" are deductible only if made
"upon the taxpayer's order and at his risk." Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(b)(3) (1957) (emphasis
added); see also Battaglia & Herskovitz, supra note 7, at 92-93. This fact is significant in light
of the position taken in this Note that software is depreciable property. See in/a notes 88-98
and accompanying text.
'5 1969-2 C.B. 303.
16 "The costs of developing software (whether or not the particular software is patented
or copyrighted) in many respects so closely resemble the kind of research and experimental
expenditures that fall within the purview of section 174" that they may be deducted as cur-
rent expenses as well. Id. at 303. Under I.R.C. § 57(a)(6) (West Supp. 1983), however, § 174
deductions are a tax preference item to the extent they exceed amounts that would have been
allowed as deductions had the expenditures been capitalized and amortized over 10 years.
Whether this applies to amounts deducted under Revenue Procedure 69-21 is not clear. See
in/fa note 68.
The Treasury Department is currently considering amendments to proposed regulations
under I.R.C. § 174 under which software development costs would not qualify for an incre-
mental 25% tax credit unless the operational feasibility of the project were in doubt. See R &
D: Critics Blast Tax Credit Proposals, as IRS Maintains Historical Software Deduction, Daily Tax
Rep. (BNA) No. 76, Apr. 19, 1983, at G-7. Critics complain that "few software costs would
qualify under the proposals because 'almost any idea or concept is operationally feasible.' "
Id. In the past, the Service has only applied the "doubtful operational feasibility" standard
to software development contracted-out to third parties, see infra note 17 and accompanying
text, and in Internal Revenue News Release 83-74, [1983] 10 STAND. FED. TAx REP. (OCH)
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ments to a third party as costs of developing software if the costs are
incurred at the risk of the taxpayer and for the development of new or
significantly improved programs, as distinguished from other software
costs where the operational feasibility of the program is not seriously in
doubt. 17
For example, a company may want to develop computer software
but be unable or unwilling to finance the project either with internal
funds or debt or equity capital.' 8 As a first step toward setting up the R
& D limited partnership, the company may notify an independent R &
D funding organization of its need for investors.' 9 The funding organi-
zation will locate individuals interested in becoming limited partners in
a partnership that will hire the company to develop the software. Once
the funding organization has located enough investors, it forms a limited
partnership and acts as general partner.20 The partnership then enters
into three agreements with the company: a research and development
contract, an option to license, and an option to purchase.
The research and development contract is drafted to allow the part-
nership to treat payments to the company as costs of developing
software under Revenue Procedure 69-21. This contract specifies that
6527, the Service stated that "the method of accounting for computer software development
costs established in 1969 will not be superseded by" these amendments. However, despite the
favorable tone of the Release and the Service's historic treatment of software under Revenue
Procedure 69-21, the taxpayer should bear in mind that Congress has attributed the "doubt-
ful operational feasibility" gloss to the meaning of "costs of developing computer software" in
Revenue Procedure 69-21 generally. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 114.
17 See Ltr. Rul. 7804007, at 2-3:
It is [the Service's] understanding that neither the operational feasibility nor
the cost of the software were in doubt at the time the contact was entered into
... . Accordingly, we do not view the cost of converting software in the
instant case as a cost of developing software within the meaning of section 3 of
Rev. Proc. 69-21, but rather as a cost of purchased software.
18 For a comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of the R & D limited partner-
ship with debt and equity financing see F. Chilton, J. Fuller &J. Garahan, R &D Partnerships
in COMPUTER FINANCE AND LEASING, RECENT TRENDS IN FINANCING AND MARKETING
(PLI) 553 (1982) [hereinafter cited as R & D Partnerships].
19 R & D funding organizations are similar to venture-capital companies. They special-
ize in raising R & D money and acting as general partner in the resulting limited partner-
ships. The company may also form a new subsidiary to seek out investors and act as general
partner itself. See Battaglia & Herskovitz, supra note 7, at 92.
20 Selecting the general partner can raise difficult conflict-of-interest problems. Ideally,
the company, acting as general partner, could retain control over the development and ex-
ploitation of the software. Because the general partner is a fiduciary for the limited partners,
however, such an arrangement could create conflicts of interest. For example, if the company
acts as both general partner and R & D contractor, it must monitor its own compliance as
contractor. The company acting as general partner is one factor the Financial Accounting
Standards Board considers in raising a rebuttable presumption that the R & D arrangement
is a disguised borrowing. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, STATEMENT OF FI-
NANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 68, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ARRANGE-
MENTS 8(c), 32 (Oct. 1982) [hereinafter cited as FASB STATEMENT No. 68]; see also R &D
Partnerships, supra note 18, at 564-67.
1983] SALE OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE
the company is to use such payments solely for research or experimental
expenditures. The company agrees to develop specified software on be-
half of the partnership but does not guarantee the success of the project.
The partnership agrees to bear all risks associated with the development
and holds all legal rights to any patents, copyrights, trade secrets, or
know-how developed under the contract.
The parties enter into two other agreements that regulate the tim-
ing and terms of the company's option to purchase the software devel-
oped. The interim license agreement grants the company an option to
license the software on a nonexclusive basis for one year following its
development. 21 The option and sale agreement grants the company an
option to purchase the software after the interim license has expired. 22
These agreements ensure the company's right to purchase the software if
development is successful, and allow the partnership to satisfy the one-
year holding period requirement of section 1223.23
21 See R & D Partnerships, supra note 18, at 557.
22 Id
23 See generally Battaglia & Herskovitz, supra note 7, at 92-95 (discussing requirements
that R & D limited partnership must satisfy to obtain § 174 deduction).
The R & D limited partnership arrangement described here (the "royalty partnership")
is one of at least three alternative methods of financing with limited partnerships. The other
two-the "equity partnership" and the R & D "joint venture"- pose fewer capital gains
problems, but introduce additional problems of their own. The preceding terminology and
following discussion are taken substantially from R &D Partnerships, supra note 18, at 555-64.
The "equity partnership" can be used where an individual inventor, rather than a going
corporation, is seeking financing. The inventor and investors who are not interested in imme-
diate deductions form a corporation that becomes the general partner in the R & D limited
partnership. Investors who become limited partners will receive immediate deductions under
§ 174. The partnership need not, and does not, contract-out the development work because
the corporate general partner can perform these services. Once the software is developed, all
the partners exchange their partnership interests for stock in a tax-free § 351 formation of a
controlled corporation that will exploit the software. After holding the stock for more than
one year, the partner-shareholders can sell their shares in the corporation and obtain long-
term capital gain treatment. The "equity partnership" presents problems in establishing the
status of the partnership under § 761, qualifying the incorporation under § 351, and finding a
market for the shares of the new corporation once the holding period has passed.
The R & D "joint venture" arrangement begins with an existing corporation and a lim-
ited partnership consisting of limited partners and an independent general partner. The lim-
ited partnership and the corporation enter into a joint venture structured as a general
partnership. The corporation contributes part of its on-going business, such as marketing, to
allow the joint venture to be carrying on a trade or business under § 162 during the research
period. The joint venture then enters into a contract with the corporation under which the
corporation agrees to develop the software on behalf of, and at the risk of, the joint venture
under Revenue Procedure 69-21. The corporation and the limited partnership each have an
option to purchase the other's interest in the joint venture more than one year after the re-
search period ends, with the corporation's option taking precedence. Because the joint ven-
ture is carrying on a trade or business it can deduct nonresearch costs under § 162, and may
qualify for the research and development credit under § 44F. See supra note 9. The joint
venture arrangement, however, creates the problems of integrating the "contributed" on-go-
ing business with the research activities, and determining whether a purchase of the partner-
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III
QUALIFYING THE SALE FOR LONG-TERM CAPITAL GAIN
TREATMENT
A sale of computer software will qualify for long-term capital gain
treatment if the software is a capital asset and the transaction satisfies
both the sale or exchange and holding period requirements of the
Code.24
A. Software As a Capital Asset
Section 1221 defines capital asset broadly as "property held by the
taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade of business). '25 This
definition is limited, however, by section 1221's five exclusions26 and ju-
dicial decisions restricting its scope.
1. Software as "Property" under Section 1221
The Supreme Court has held that "[w]hile a capital asset is defined
in [section 1221] as 'property held by the taxpayer,' it is evident that not
everything which can be called property in the ordinary sense and
which is outside the statutory exclusions qualifies as a capital asset."' 27
ship interest in lieu of a purchase of the software will qualify for long-term capital gain
treatment.
24 Under certain circumstances, a sale of computer software may qualify for long-term
capital gain treatment even though the software does not qualify as a capital asset. See inj/a
notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
25 I.R.C. § 1221 (1976) (Capital Asset Defined) provides:
For purposes of this subtitle, the term "capital asset" means property
held by the taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade or business),
but does not include-
(1) stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which
would properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at
the close of the taxable year, or property held by the taxpayer primarily for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business;
(2) property, used in his trade or business, of a character which is sub-
ject to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 167, or real prop-
erty used in his trade or business;
(3) a copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition, a letter or
memorandum, or similar property, held by-
(A) a taxpayer whose personal efforts created such property,
(B) in the case of a letter, memorandum, or similar property, a tax-
payer for whom such property was prepared or produced, or
(C) a taxpayer in whose hands the basis of such property is deter-
mined, for purposes of determining gain from a sale or exchange, in
whole or in part by reference to the basis of such property in the hands of
a taxpayer described in subparagraph (A) or (B). ...
26 Id The fourth and fifth exceptions deal with notes and accounts receivable and pub-
lications of the United States government.
27 Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transp., Inc., 364 U.S. 130, 134 (1960). Although
state and local taxing authorities disagree over whether software is tangible or intangible
property for purposes of sales, use, and property taxes, no reported decision has held that
software is not property "in the ordinary sense." Set Comment, Soj/2warT Taatiom. A Critical
Reevaluation of the Notion of Intangibility, 1980 B.Y.U. L. REv. 859, 860-61.
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Computer software developed under an R & D limited partnership ar-
rangement qualifies as section 1221 property for three reasons. First,
software is analogous to types of know-how that courts have held to be
property within the meaning of section 1221. Second, it satisfies the
Service's requirement that know-how be secret. Finally, because the
partnership has not been "hired to invent," the software constitutes
property rather than services.
The Code does not state whether know-how is property within the
meaning of section 1221.28 Indeed, neither property 29 nor know-how 30
has been precisely defined for tax purposes. In general usage, know-how
encompasses nearly all the tangible products of mankind's ideas and
skills.3 ' Software certainly satisfies this definition;32 a computer program
embodies the knowledge of its producer and applies that knowledge
without further human intervention. However, not all know-how is sec-
tion 1221 property.
Courts have held that know-how in the form of secret formulas,
industrial knowledge, and manufacturing processes as represented by
manuals, reports, and other documents, constitutes section 1221 prop-
erty.33 Software is functionally similar to a manual. A computer pro-
28 The only references in the Code to the property status of know-how are in §§ 861 and
862 (determination of income earned by nonresident aliens and foreign corporations from
sources within and without the United States) which construe rents and royalties to include
payments for the use of "patents, copyrights, secret processes and formulas, goodwill, trade-
marks, trade brands, franchises and other like property." I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(4), 862(a)(4)
(1976).
29 I.R.C. §§ 317 (corporate distributions), 614 (depletion allowance), 1231 (property
used in a trade or business), and 1235 (patents as property) provide specialized definitions of
property but add nothing to its generic definition or its application to know-how.
30 "A great deal of difficulty has been experienced in defining the categories of commer-
cial and industrial know-how which will qualify as 'property' for Section 1221 purposes ....
[T]he term 'know-how' has had a confused meaning." J. BISCHEL, TAXATION OF PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, COPYRIGHTS, AND KNow-How 1.2a[3], 1-5 to -6 (1974).
31 See J. BISCHEL, supra note 30, at 1-6.
32 In no case dealing with the property status of know-how under § 1221 has the Service
challenged the taxpayer's characterization of the asset as know-how. See infia note 33 (cases
cited presume without discussion that property at issue is know-how).
33 See, e.g., Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp. v. United States, 591 F.2d 652, 659-62 (Ct.
Cl. 1979) (company can realize capital gain on assignment of patent rights and know-how
concerning the chemical treatment of metal surfaces for bonding and rustproofing); Ofria v.
Commissioner, 77 T.C. 524, 544-45 (1981) (proposals for improving fuse bomb coupler are
know-how qualifying as property for § 1221 purposes); United States Mineral Prods. Co. v.
Commissioner, 52 T.C. 177, 199 (1969), acg., 1969-2 C.B. xxv (manuals, reports, and other
documents describing the methods for manufacturing a sprayed insulation product are capi-
tal assets); Speicher v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 938, 944-45 (1957) (inventor can realize capital
gain on assignment of unpatented machines).
Other cases have considered trade secrets or unpatented technology to be capital assets
although ultimately finding that the transaction failed to satisfy the sale or exchange require-
ment. See, e.g., Pickren v. United States, 378 F.2d 595, 599-601 (5th Cir. 1967) (secret
formula); E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904, 909-12 (Ct. Cl.
1961) (secret process for producing sodium); Kaczmarek v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH)
501, 505 n.5 (1982) (unpatented industrial-material shredding machine with manufacturing
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gram is, in tangible form, a set of instructions designed to cause the
computer to perform certain actions.3 4 A manual is similar except that
it instructs a human being rather than a computer to perform the ac-
tions. In some instances the relationship transcends similarity; indus-
trial processes that would have been encoded in manuals in the past are
being encoded in computer programs today. 35
According to the Service, know-how must be secret to qualify as
section 1221 property.3 6 Courts, however, have rejected this strict re-
drawings, technical data, and know-how); Glen O'Brien Movable Partition Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 70 T.C. 492, 502-05 (1978) (know-how relating to partition-system business); Taylor-
Winfield Corp. v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 205, 206-13 (1971), a 'd, 467 F.2d 483 (6th Cir.
1972) (industrial knowledge); see also infra notes 121-37 and accompanying text (discussion of
sale or exchange requirement).
34 See Rev. Proc. 69-21, 1969-2 C.B. 303 ("For the purpose of this Revenue Procedure,
'computer software' includes all programs or routines used to cause a computer to perform a
desired task or set of tasks.").
35 See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (involving computer program that
controlled industrial rubber-curing process).
36 Section 1221 know-how cases frequently involve the argument that know-how must
be secret to constitute property. See, e.g., Huckins v. United States, 60-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
T 9394, at 76,091 (S.D. Fla. 1960) (Government contended "secret process" was not § 1221
property because process had previously been made available to Navy.); Ofria v. Commis-
sioner, 77 T.C. 524, 542 (1981) ("The Government. . . contends that. . . the property right
qualifying trade secrets as capital assets is the right to a competitive advantage by use of data
unknown to others . . . .'); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 928, 1011 (1970)
(Service argued that process in issue was "widely known" and therefore did not qualify as
property for purposes of capital gains treatment); United States Mineral Prods. Co. v. Com-
missioner, 52 T.C. 177, 197 (1969), acq., 1969-2 C.B. xxv ("The parties agree that if [the
formulas] were 'secret,' they constituted 'property' within the meaning of section 1221.").
Further, although there is no necessary connection between § 351 (transfer to corpora-
tion controlled by transferor) and § 1221, the Service has developed an extensive theory
under § 351 as to when know-how constitutes property. Revenue Ruling 64-56, 1964-1 (Part
1) C.B. 133, states:
The term "property" for purposes of section 351 of the Code will be held
to include anything qualifying as "secret processes and formulas" within the
meaning of sections 861(a) (4) and 862(a)(4) of the Code and any other secret
information as to a device, process, etc., in the general nature of a patentable
invention without regard to whether a patent has been applied for and with-
out regard to whether it is patentable in the patent law sense. Other informa-
tion which is secret will be given consideration as "property" on a case-by-
case basis.
It is assumed for the purpose of this Revenue Ruling that the country in
which the transferee is to operate affords to the transferor substantial legal
protection against the unauthorized disclosure and use of the process,
formula, or other secret information involved.
Id at 134 (citations omitted). Revenue Procedure 69-19, 1969-2 C.B. 301, provides guidelines
for when know-how will be treated as property for purposes of advance rulings under §§ 367
and 351. Revenue Procedure 69-19 requires, inter alia, representations that the "informa-
tion" is "original, unique, and novel," that it is not disclosed by the product on which it is
used or to which it is related, and that it is "secret," being "known only by the owner and
those confidential employees who require the "information" for use in the conduct of the
activities to which it is related and adequate safeguards have been taken to guard the secret
against unauthorized disclosure." Note, however, that Revenue Procedure 69-19 has no effect
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quirement37 and have held that section 1221 property includes: know-
how that is secret at the time of transfer even though later revealed to
others,38 know-how disclosed to another party prior to sale, 39 and know-
how contained in sales and cost-estimating manuals available to
competitors.40
Although the Service has rarely succeeded on the secrecy issue4'
and in some cases, even failed to raise it,42 the Commissioner may still
assert the theory and has done so as recently as 1981.43 Thus, although
one can argue that secrecy is not the best means by which to measure
the property status of know-how, 44 to avoid litigation and to protect its
upon the substantive provisions and requirements of Revenue Ruling 64-56. Rev. Proc. 69-
19, at 302.
Further, Revenue Procedure 74-36, 1974-2 C.B. 491, makes Revenue Procedure 69-19
specifically "applicable to a request for a ruling that the transfer of 'computer software'is a
transfer of property within the meaning of section 351." Rev. Proc. 74-36, 1974-2 C.B. 491.
Each of the 11 private letter rulings issued determining the status of computer software under
§ 351 has held the software to be property. See, e.g., Ltr. Ruls. 8301004, 8034158, 8034096,
8028103, 7940059, 7938057, 7851089, 7841073, 7824043, 7817055, 7427058.
37 E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904 (Ct. Cl. 1961), a case
involving the proposition that know-how must be secret, is frequently cited in connection
with § 1221 patent and know-how cases. However, a careful reading of the case reveals that
the § 1221 property status of know-how was not even in question. The government had con-
ceded that the "secret" formula at issue was property. The only issue in question was whether
secrecy affected the transaction's meeting the sale or exchange requirement. For examples of
cases citing DuPont, see, Ofria v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 524, 539 (1981); Taylor-Winfield
Corp. v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 205, 215 (1971), aJ'd, 467 F.2d 483 (6th Cir. 1972); PPG
Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 928, 1012 (1970); United States Mineral Prods. Co. v.
Commissioner, 52 T.C. 177, 199 (1969), acq., 1969-2 C.B. xxv.
38 Ofria v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 524, 543-44 (1981).
39 Huckins v. Commissioner, 60-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9394, at 76,092 (S.D. Fla.
1960).
40 United States Mineral Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 177, 199 (1969), acq.,
1969-2 C.B. xxv.
41 See, e.g., supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
42 See, e.g., Cubic Corp. v. United States, 72-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9165 (S.D. Cal.
1971) (Service failed to make argument that nonsecret manufacturing know-how does not
constitute § 1221 property); Kaczmarek v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 501, 504 (1982)
(Service did not even raise issue of whether know-how was property, restricting argument to
theory that there had not been sale of all substantial rights); Taylor-Winfield Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 57 T.C. 205 (1971), aft,' 467 F.2d 483 (6th Cir. 1972) (same as Cubic Corp.).
43 See Ofria v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 524, 542 (1981).
44 Indeed, the first Restatement of Torts protects trade secrets not on the basis of prop-
erty theory, but upon the theory that misappropriation of a trade secret is a breach of the
duty of good faith. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment a (1939). This section was not
included in the second Restatement of Torts because the drafters no longer considered the
law of unfair competition and trade regulation to be dependent upon tort law. RESTATE-
MENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS, Division Nine, Introductory Note, at 1-2 (1977).
Further, secrecy is by no means the only indication of the value of know-how:
In contrast to the rather narrowly defined trade secret there would appear to
be other forms of know-how in which the possessor may own something of
value for a potential purchaser. For instance, the know-how may consist of a
process known only by a few competitors in a large industry. Such a process
may, nevertheless, constitute valuable information to one who desires to enter
that industry. Another example of valuable information might consist of a
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investment, the R & D limited partnership should maintain secrecy by
obtaining nondisclosure agreements from all persons working on the
project.45
The software may also lose its capital asset status if the buyer has
complete package of documents disclosing a highly technical although com-
monly known process in the industry. The reduced cost of acquiring this in-
formation in mass, rather than piecemeal, could prove to be a substantial
savings, and thus of value to a potential purchaser. Finally, the possibility
always exists that what is considered common knowledge at one place may be
considered a revelation at another.
Bischel, Exportation of American Technology and the Federal Income Tax, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 867,
877-78 (1971).
For some purposes, however, secrecy may be a reliable measure of value. For example, in
a non-arm's length transaction, secrecy of the know-how transferred may be useful in deter-
mining whether related parties have assigned it a value that is, in fact, consideration for
something else.
45 Under certain circumstances it may be unnecessary to maintain trade secrecy to pro-
tect the software or to establish § 1221 property status. If the partnership is reasonably cer-
tain that patent protection will be available, the sale or exchange of the software may qualify
for long-term capital gain treatment under § 1235 (sale of patents) without regard to secrecy.
See generally Garahan, Subtle Legal Problems: Research and Development Linited Partnerships, Nat'l
L.J., Sept. 20, 1982, at 17, col. 1, at 22, col. 3. Section 1235 affords such treatment regardless
of the length of the seller's holding period and regardless of whether the seller holds the
patent primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business, provided
the "holder" transfers "all substantial rights to a patent." See infra notes 122-34 and accom-
panying text.
The taxpayer must fulfill a number of technical requirements to qualify under § 1235.
Although § 1235 only applies to patentable software, neither the patent nor the patent appli-
cation need be in existence at the time of the transfer. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(a) (1957). A
holder of a patent is defined as the inventor or any individual (other than the inventor's
employer or a related person within the meaning of § 1235(d)) who purchases an interest in
the patent before it is "reduced to practice." I.R.C. § 1235(b) (1976). Thus, in an R & D
limited partnership arrangement, the partnership must obtain its rights to the software from
the individual inventors, not from the company, and the partnership must not employ the
inventors. Also, if the sum of the partners' stock interests in the company exceeds 25%, the
amounts paid those partners will not qualify because § 1235 does not apply to related parties.
Id. § 1235(d).
If both the software and the partners qualify under § 1235, the partnership will not have
to wait a year before completing the sale, it will not have to avoid the "held primarily for sale
to customers in the ordinary course of. . . trade or business" restriction of §§ 1221 and 1231,
and its future royalties will not be taxed as interest income, id § 483(0 (4) (1976); see in/ra note
136 and accompanying text.
If a transfer of patentable software does not qualify under § 1235, "[tlhe tax conse-
quences of such transfers shall be determined under other provisions of the internal revenue
laws." Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-1(b) (1957). Although the Tax Court has held that "if the pay-
ments for a patent are contingent upon productivity, use or disposition . . . section 1235 is
the holder's exclusive provision for qualifying for capital gains treatment," Poole v. Commis-
sioner, 46 T.C. 392, 404 (1966), the Service has taken the position that "the mere fact that a
patent transfer by a holder for contingent amounts does not qualify . . .under Section 1235
• . . will not prevent it from qualifying . . .under other provisions of the Code," Rev. Rul.
69-482, 1969-2 C.B. 164, 165; see also Lee v. United States, 302 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Wis. 1969)
(although taxpayer not entitled to long-term capital gain treatment under § 1235, he is enti-
tled to such treatment under §§ 1221 and 1231); Thomson v. United States, 70-i U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) 1 9193, at 82,798-800 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
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"hired" the developer to "invent" it.46 Under the "hired to invent" doc-
trine, a court may deny property status to know-how if it determines
that the partnership has been compensated for services rather than paid
in exchange for a transfer of property. The determination is factual47
and although courts developed the guiding principles in cases involving
transfers of patents, 48 the principles apply equally well to transfers of
know-how. 49 In general, if a contract provides that inventions devel-
oped during performance of a contract become the property of the em-
ployer, then the courts will treat payments to the inventor as
compensation for services. If the contract does not so provide, the inven-
tor may have property rights in the invention and the courts are more
likely to treat payments for the invention as payments in exchange for
property.50
The "hired to invent" doctrine will only affect the transfer of
software from the partnership to the company, if the company has hired
the partnership to develop the software. Under the research and devel-
opment agreement, in contrast, the partnership hires the company. One
might argue, however, that despite the express language of the agree-
46 See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933):
One employed to make an invention, who succeeds, during his term of
service, in accomplishing that task, is bound to assign to his employer any
patent obtained. The reason is that he has only produced that which he was
employed to invent. His invention is the precise subject of the contract of
employment. A term of the agreement necessarily is that what he is paid to
produce belongs to his paymaster. On the other hand, if the employment be
general, albeit it cover a field of labor and effort in the performance of which
the employee conceived the invention for which he obtained a patent, the
contract is not so broadly construed as to require an assignment of the patent.
Id at 187 (citations omitted); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-1(c)(2) (1957) (discussing whether
payments to employee are payments for services or payments for transfer of rights to
invention).
47 See Beausoleil v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 244,247 (1976); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-
1(c)(2) (1957) ("[W]hether payments received by an employee from his employer . ..are
attributable to the transfer by the employee of all substantial rights to a patent or are
compensation for services rendered the employer by the employee is a question of fact.").
48 See, e.g., Melin v. United States, 478 F.2d 1210, 1213-15 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Beausoleil v.
Commissioner, 66 T.C. 244 (1976); Gable v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1427, 1432-33
(1974); Hamrick v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 21, 35 (1964); Chilton v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.
552, 562-63 (1963); Blum v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 101 (1948), a fd, 183 F.2d 281 (3d Cir.
1950).
49 Ofria v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 524, 535 (1981) (patent principles regarding "hired to
invent" doctrine apply "to payments for commercially valuable trade secrets or know-how, or
data similar to patents'). Even though this is the only case that considers the services-prop-
erty issue in connection with unpatented technology, courts have frequently held that patent
cases are applicable to cases involving unpatented technology and know-how. See infia notes
122, 139 and accompanying text.
50 Compare Downs v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 533, 537-39 (1968) (compensation for serv-
ices) and Blum v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 101, 108-10 (1948) (same), afd, 183 F.2d 281 (3d
Cir. 1950) with Ofria v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 524, 535-36 (1981) (payment in exchange for
property) and Chilton v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 552, 562-63 (1963) (same) and McClain v.
Commissioner, 40 T.C. 841, 849-50 (1963) (same).
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ment, it was actually the company that hired the partnership because
the company originally sought out the partnership. For the partnership
to be "hired to invent," however, any software developed would have to
become the property of the company under the contract. The research
and development agreement precludes this problem by providing that
the partnership owns the software at all times. The company can ac-
quire the software only by exercising its option to purchase.
One might argue that the costs of according know-how favorable
tax treatment by treating it as section 1221 property outweigh the bene-
fits. Because know-how frequently straddles the line between property
and services, and because know-how transactions are relatively insignifi-
cant compared to the types of transactions that Congress intended to be
able to qualify for capital gain treatment, the social cost of litigation to
determine the status of any particular item of know-how outweighs the
individual benefit.
This argument overlooks several points. First, the partnership can
obtain a private letter ruling from the Service in advance on these issues
and thus avoid the cost of litigation.5 1 Second, the broad language of
section 1221 and the extension of capital gain treatment to the sale of
patents under section 1235, indicate congressional intent to leave some
flexibility in the definition of "property." Third, although courts have
limited the meaning of property under section 1221 in some respects,
they have expressly extended it to include know-how, 52 and in doing so
have frequently drawn upon the Code provisions and case law concern-
ing the sale of patents. 53 Finally, neither Congress nor the courts have
ever chosen to limit the application of capital gain treatment on cost-
benefit grounds.
2. Statutog Exclusions
a. Section 1221(1). Section 1221(1) excludes from capital asset
status "property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in
the ordinary course of his trade or business."'54 This section presents
three problems for the R & D limited partnership arrangement. First,
the software developed must not come within the literal or substantive
51 Applying for the letter ruling entails its own costs in the forms of attorney's fees and
IRS resources expended, but usually these costs will be less than those incurred in litigation.
52 See supra notes 33, 37-40 and accompanying text.
53 See infra notes 122, 139 and accompanying text. One can also argue that software is
property within the meaning of§ 1221 because it can be copyrighted. A copyright that is not
excluded by § 1221(3)'s "personal efforts" and "same basis" requirements may be a capital
asset. Cf Battaglia & Herskovitz, supra note 7, at 95.
54 I.R.C. § 1221(1) excludes from capital asset status:
stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would prop-
erly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the
taxable year, or property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers
in the ordinary course of his trade or business.
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meaning of the section. Second, in avoiding section 1221(1), the part-
nership runs the risk of losing its section 174 deduction. Third, if the
company impliedly or expressly agrees to purchase the software devel-
oped regardless of the project's success, it runs the risk of jeopardizing
the arrangement's tax benefits.
The software sold by the R & D limited partnership to the com-
pany does not constitute property held primarily for sale in the ordinary
course of its trade or business. Courts, in cases involving patents or in-
ventions,55 have considered the following factors in making this determi-
nation:5 6 (1) the frequency of comparable sales; (2) the number and
55 Two cases have extended the patent-or-invention principles to know-how. Cubic
Corp. v. United States, 72-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9165, at 83,683 (S.D. Cal. 1971) (court
assumed it was dealing with know-how, a patent, or a combination of both); Ofria v. Com-
missioner, 77 T.C. 524, 535 (1981). Courts generally extend patent-law principles to know-
how cases. See, e.g., infra notes 122, 139 and accompanying text.
56 In patent cases the courts use the "factor" test to determine not only whether a trade
or business exists, but also whether a patent is held primarily for sale. Indeed, the cases do not
even distinguish the issues. See, e.g., cases cited infla note 59. Thus, if a court determines that
a taxpayer is engaged in the trade or business of selling patents or inventions it will also find
that the patents or inventions are held primarily for sale, and they will be excluded from
capital asset status under § 1221(1).
Even if a court found that a taxpayer was not engaged in the trade or business of selling
patents or inventions, it could still exclude the items under § 1221 by ignoring the "factor"
test and analyzing the "held primarily for sale" issue as the First Circuit did in International
Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 491 F.2d 157 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 834 (1974).
In that case, a manufacturer of shoe machinery was engaged primarily in leasing the machin-
ery but would sell it if a customer insisted. The court held that the word "primarily" in the
statute invoked a contrast, not between sales and leases, but between sales made in the ordi-
nary course of business and sales made as nonroutine liquidations of inventory.
If International Shoe Machine were applied to single-venture patent cases, many casual in-
ventors might be found to hold their inventions primarily for sale in the ordinary course of
business, even though they were not engaged in the trade or business of selling patents or
inventions. For example, in Ofria v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 524, 545 (1981), know-how was
not "held 'primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of. . .business' " because
the evidence indicated that "the sale of inventions was not an accepted and predictable part
of [the inventor's] business, and that the sales. . . were isolated, nonrecurring transactions."
Presumably, the court could have applied International Shoe Machine and found that because
the sale of know-how was not a "nonroutine liquidation," it constituted a sale in the ordinary
course of business. The court, however, refused to apply International Shoe Machine without
offering any explanation. Id (dismissing possible application by referring to case with intro-
ductory signal ' cf. "). With respect to the R & D limited partnership arrangement, however,
it may be argued that the sale of the software developed would not be a sale in the ordinary
course of business even under Intenzational Shoe Machine because the sale of the partnership's
only asset represents a complete and therefore nonroutine liquidation.
The taxpayer in International Shoe Machine argued that it was in the business of leasing
machinery, and that selling machinery was not an accepted or predictable part of its business.
Arguably, selling a patent totally unrelated to one's trade or business would not constitute an
accepted'or predictable part of the business. Patent cases involving taxpayers who have been
involved in licensing inventions prior to selling them, however, present a more difficult case.
Under the "factor" test these inventors are not in the business of selling patents or inventions
because the consideration received for licensing can be different than that received in a sale.
See infra note 57. Such a distinction probably could not be maintained under International Shoe
Machine where the distinction between selling and leasing was immaterial.
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variety of inventions sold; (3) the number of customers; (4) the nature
and extent of efforts to sell; (5) the consideration received; and (6) details
of the taxpayer's employment and business ventures.5 7 Although no one
factor is determinative, 58 a single isolated sale of an invention usually
does not constitute a trade or business of selling inventions.59
The R & D limited partnership's sale of software meets the literal
requirements of the "factor" test. If the company exercises its option,
the partnership will be involved in only one sale, involving only one
software package, one customer, and no effort to sell beyond the secur-
57 See Beach v. Shaughnessy, 126 F. Supp. 771, 774 (N.D.N.Y. 1954); cf. Ross v. United
States, 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9183, at 86,266 (W.D. Wash. 1974); C.A. Norgren Co. v.
United States, 268 F. Supp. 816, 824 (D. Colo. 1967); Armco Steel Co. v. United States, 263
F. Supp. 749, 756 (S.D. Ohio 1966); Allied Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 66-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 9212, at 88,373 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),aJ'don other grounds, 370 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1967). See
generaly Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 615, 738-45 (1956).
Regarding the type of consideration received, if the partnership's other business ventures
only involve licensing and not the sale of patents or inventions, a court will regard such
consideration as indicating that the taxpayer is not engaged in the trade or business of selling
patents or inventions. E.g., C.A. Norgren Co. v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 816, 824 (D.
Colo. 1967) (that type of consideration was royalty percentage of transferee's lent support to
conclusion that patents were not held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
business); Barlow v. Commissioner, 2 T.C.M. (CCH) 133, 139 (1943) ("[I]t is not permissible
to exclude patents or inventions which are not held for sale to customers, but only licensed, by
one who is in business as an inventor and derives gain from giving licenses on his inven-
tions."). Although this factor may not seem immediately relevant to the R & D limited part-
nership formed solely to develop one product, courts may, in some instances, look beyond the
single venture to other transactions in which the individual partners have participated. See
infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
58 Tidwell v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 864 (4th Cir. 1962); Allied Chem. Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 66-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9212, at 85,373 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), af'don other grounds,
370 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1967).
59 Beach v. Shaughnessy, 126 F. Supp. 771, 775 (N.D.N.Y. 1954) ("[T]he weight of au-
thority and the trend of decisions is to require that a single non-recurrent sale of a patent does
not establish a trade or business. . . ."); see also Ross v. United States, 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 9183, at 86,266 (W.D. Wash. 1974) ("Since plaintiffs. . . have produced only one
invention and have not engaged in the business of selling patent rights, the transfer of their
patent was not 'in the ordinary course of business.' "); Cubic Corp. v. United States, 72-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) 9165, at 83,683 (S.D. Cal. 1972):
I find from the general nature of the plaintiff's business, from the infrequency
of the transfers of manufacturing and selling rights, and from the relatively
small percentage of income received from such transfers that the design and
patent rights and the manufacturing "know how" were . . . [not] held pri-
marily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of trade or business.
C.A. Norgren Co. v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 816, 824 (D. Colo. 1967) ("The infrequency
of such sales, the small number of 'customers', and the type of consideration . . . all lend
support to our conclusion: The patents were not held primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of business.") (emphasis in original); Armco Steel Co. v. United States, 263 F.
Supp. 749, 756 (S.D. Ohio 1966) ("[T]he infrequency of the few isolated transactions also
militates against a determination that they were entered into in the ordinary course of tax-
payer's trade or business."); Allied Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 66-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
9212, at 85,373 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ("Isolated sales do not show a holding for sale in the
ordinary course of business . "), afdon other grounds, 370 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1967).
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ing of the initial option agreementc ° Under the reasoning of cases in-
volving single, nonrecurrent sales of inventions, the partnership is not
engaged in a trade of business.61
Even if the partnership is not conducting a sale as part of a trade or
business within the literal meaning of section 1221(1), it may still be
within the intent of the section. One could argue, for example, that the
single nonrecurrent sale cases should involve only "casual inventors"-
basement tinkerers or weekend hobbiests-and that the R & D limited
partnership, being a sophisticated, well-planned effort to develop new
software, should be taxed as a trade or business. This argument fails for
three reasons. First, the cases in which the test has been applied do not
draw such a distinction.62 Second, there is no reason to assume that the
"casual inventor" has not proceeded to invent based upon a well-
planned effort to develop and sell his invention. Finally, to assume that
the presence of the limited partnership raises the level of sophistication
of the venture to that of a trade or business overlooks the limited part-
nership's principal functions: to pool funds and spread the risk of loss--
not to market and sell the software. If an individual investor possessing
no means or expertise with which to market the software were willing
and able to finance the development himself, he could probably do so
under the same arrangements as the limited partnership without even
raising this issue.
" Courts may consider the activities of partners in determining
whether a partnership is engaged in a trade or business under section
1221.63 Indeed, because one element of the "factor" test is the details of
60 If the partnership is unable to sell the software to the developing company, it may
have to engage in a marketing effort of magnitude sufficient to bring it within § 1221(1).
Courts have held that a single, nonrecurrent venture accompanied by substantial sales activ-
ity may constitute a trade or business. E.g., Hollis v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 191, 194
(N.D. Ohio 1954) (syndicate to purchase and resell Japanese art objects held not an "invest-
ment," but a trade or business); Zack v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 676, 681 (1955), a ff'dper
cunam, 245 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1957) (joint venture in war surplus involving general public
offering and sales, not an "investment'). But cf. Currie v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 185, 201
(1969), acq., 1970-2 C.B. xix (syndicate organized to buy and resell stock realized long-term
capital gain on sale).
Note that if the company rejects the software because it is of little value, and the sale to a
third party ultimately results in a loss, the partnership would benefit from the denial of capi-
tal asset status because it could then take an ordinary loss on the sale.
61 The selling stage is only one of three stages through which the partnership evolves.
The other stages are the research stage and the interim license stage. For a discussion of these
stages, see in/fa notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
62 Compare Lamar v. Granger, 99 F. Supp. 17 (W.D. Pa. 1951) (individual taxpayer
received capital gain treatment on sale of invention produced in spare time) with Ofria v.
Commissioner, 77 T.C. 524,545 (1981) (engineering company received capital gain treatment
on sale of improvements in fuse bomb coupler).
63 See, e.g., Blackburn v. Phinney, 61-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9599, at 81,460 (W.D.
Tex. 1961) (In determining whether property was held primarily for sale in orainary course of
business, court considered fact that plaintiff-partners had "never been active in any real estate
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the taxpayer's employment and business ventures64 a court may look
beyond the R & D limited partnership to determine whether the general
partner or one or all of the limited partners has been involved previously
in similar R & D arrangements. 65 Because the partners benefit from cap-
ital gain treatment, a court might consider their outside activities rele-
vant in determining the trade or business issue. Once this avenue is
open, a host of questions emerges, including: Should only the offending
partners lose the benefit of capital gain treatment? Should a general
partner's repeated involvement be a concern if he does not invest?
Should investments in R & D limited partnerships involving technology
other than software be considered? To help ensure that a court will not
find that the partnership is engaged in a trade or business, investors
should avoid repeated involvement in such ventures.
One danger in arguing that the partnership is not engaged in a
trade or business connected with the sale of the software is possible de-
nial of the current R & D expense deduction under section 174 or Reve-
nue Procedure 69-21. Section 174 conditions deductibility of the
expenses incurred for research and development on their "connection
with [the taxpayer's] trade or business."'66 Revenue Procedure 69-21 re-
quires only that such expenditures be incurred "in developing software,
either for [the taxpayer's] own use or to be held by him for sale or lease
to others .... 67 If to avoid exclusion under section 1221(1), the part-
nership claims that it is not in the trade or business of selling software, it
may lose its favored status under section 174 or Revenue Procedure 69-
21.68
The broad language of Revenue Procedure 69-21 should allow the
partnership to qualify for the current expense deduction and avoid ex-
clusion from capital asset status under section 1221(1). The partnership
can hold the particular software "for sale or lease to others," without
being engaged in the trade or business of selling software69 and without
holding the software primarily for sale to customers. 70 However, if Rev-
venture"); Kimes v. Commissioner, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 1561, 1564 (1961) (court considered
past activities performed in individual capacity).
64 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
65 Cf Blackburn v. Phinney, 61-2 U.S. Tax Gas. (CCH) 9599 (W.D. Tex. 1961) (court
considered prior individual real estate experience of partners in real estate general partner-
ship); Kimes v. Commissioner, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 1561 (1961) (prior individual experience of
partner in general partnership).
66 See I.R.C. § 174(a) (1976); supra note 11.
67 Rev. Proc. 69-21, 1969-2 C.B. § 3.01, at 303.
68 Recent letter rulings suggest that qualification of software expenditures under § 174,
as opposed to Revenue Procedure 69-21, is a question of fact. See Ltr. Ruls. 8130089,
8136024, 8145077, 8211039.
69 The partnership could argue that it is investing in, rather than selling, software. Al-
though it holds its investment for eventual sale, it is not holding it primarily for sale in the
"ordinary course of business."
70 "[F]or sale or lease to others" is arguably much broader than "primarily for sale to
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enue Procedure 69-21 is held to be a special application of section 174,
its broad languge may be confined by the "in connection with his trade
or business" language of section 174.7 1
The Supreme Court has construed the language "in connection
with his trade or business" of section 174 as being less restrictive than
the "carrying on any trade or business" language of section 162.72 Fur-
ther, section 174 does not appear to require that the partnership actu-
ally manufacture or market the software, 73 or even that it ever engage in
a trade or business. 74 Thus, the partnership should be able to qualify for
current expensing under either Revenue Procedure 69-21 or section 174,
even though it is not engaged in a trade or business within the meaning
of section 1221(a).75
customers." The partnership could thus argue that because it is merely investing in software
development for the first time, it lacks customers for whom it holds the software primarily for
sale. See also supra note 56 and accompanying text.
71 Revenue Procedure 69-21, 1969-2 C.B. 303, states that "[t]he costs of developing
software. . . so closely resemble the kind of research and experimental expenditures that fall
within the purview of section 174 . . . as to warrant accounting treatment similar to that
accorded such costs under that section." Id § 3.01. This could mean either that all the re-
quirements of§ 174 should be read into the Revenue Procedure, including the "in connection
with" requirement, or, alternatively, that only the accounting treatment should be carried
over.
72 Snow v. Commissioner, 416 U.S. 500 (1974). In Snow, the Court explained that
"[s]ection 174 was enacted. . . to dilute some of the conception of 'ordinary and necessary'
business expenses under § 162(a)" and noted that "§ 162(a) is more narrowly written than is
§ 174. . . ." Id at 502-03. But see supra note 12.
73 Louw v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1421, 1423 (1971) (taxpayer entitled to
§ 174 treatment though he "never had an expectation of manufacturing or producing" his
invention).
In Snow v. Commissioner, 416 U.S. 500 (1974), a corporate successor produced and mar-
keted the technology that the partnership developed. Id at 502 n.3. This fact could lead to a
different conclusion than that reached in the text, i.e., that the corporate successor was so
closely allied with the partnership that the partnership in substance did actually engage in a
trade or business. See Battaglia & Herskovitz, supra note 7, at 92.
74 The legislative history of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 indicates that fail-
ure to ever engage in business may not preclude the § 174 deduction:
For example, under the trade or business test of new section 44F, the
credit generally is not available with regard to a taxpayer's expenditures for
"outside" or contract research intended to be transferred by the taxpayer to
another in return for license or royalty payments. (Receipt of royalties does
not constitute a trade or business under present law, even though expenses
attributable to those royalties are deductible from gross income in arriving at
adjusted gross income.) In such a case, the nexus between the research and
the transferee's activities generally would be insufficient to support a finding
that the taxpayer had incurred the research expenditures in carrying on a
trade or business. (Under appropnpate circumstances, nevertheless, the nexus might be
deemed adequate for purposes of the section 174 deduction elections.)
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 113 (emphasis added).
75 The partnership could argue, in the alternative that because it qualifies for the § 174
deduction it is engaged in the business of licensing software. However, to be in the trade or
business'of licensing software the partnership would have to engage in some minimal activity
beyond the receipt of royalties. See infia notes 103-05 and accompanying text. If the partner-
ship were in such a business, it would be excluded from capital asset status under § 1221(2),
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Although the partnership may not be engaged in a trade or busi-
ness in the "busyness" sense examined under the "factor" test, a court
may still find a trade or business if the company expressly agrees to
purchase the software. Courts have held that development of a single
asset followed closely by a prearranged sale may constitute a trade or
business. 7 6 By assuring the seller of recouping his costs, the preexisting
arrangements remove the speculative nature of the venture, 77 undermin-
ing the long-term appreciation in value rationale behind capital gain
treatment.78 These cases involve prearrangements such as a contractual
obligation to purchase and a letter agreement ensuring the exercise of an
option. The partnership can avoid this problem by ensuring that the
company does not obligate itself to purchase the software or otherwise
guarantee that the partnership will recover its costs. 79 Even in the ab-
but would still be able to qualify under § 1231, see infra note 106 and accompanying text.
However, to qualify under § 123 1(b)(1)(B), it would have to show that it was not holding the
software primarily for sale in the ordinary course of business. See infra notes 106-08 and ac-
companying text. Because the partnership would be in the business of licensing, rather than
selling software, and the eventual sale of the software would be in the nature of a liquidation,
it would not qualify as holding the software "primarily for sale." See supra note 56. Thus, it
could qualify for the § 174 deduction and capital gain treatment under § 1231. Se Battaglia
& Herskovitz, supra note 7, at 95.
76 DeMars v. United States, 71-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9288, at 86,117 (S.D. Ind.
1968) ("[P]roperty acquired [in a single venture] for the purpose of sale to a specific party
pursuant to a pre-existing arrangement [a letter agreement ensuring exercise of option] consti-
tutes property held for sale in the ordinary course of a trade or business."); S & H, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 78 T.C. 234, 244 (1982) (where purchaser contractually obligated to buy, sin-
gle venture constituted trade or business for purposes of § 1221(1)).
77 S & H, Inc. v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 234, 245 (1982).
78 Id at 242. In support of the long-term-appreciation rationale, the court cites Malat v.
Riddell, 383 U.S. 569 (1966) which states:
The purpose of [§ 1221(1)] is to differentiate between the "profits and losses
arising from the everyday operation of a business" on the one hand (Corn Prod-
uctr Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 52) and "the realization of appreciation
in value accrued over a substantial period of time" on the other. (Commissioner
v. Gillette Motor Co., 346 U.S. 130, 134.)
Id at 572.
In Corn Prods. Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 52 (1955), the Supreme
Court held that Congress's intent was for profits and losses arising from the everyday opera-
tion of a business to be treated as ordinary gains. No court has yet applied this doctrine to
sales of know-how-probably because its application requires that the taxpayer be engaged in
a trade or business or that the sale of know-how be related to its trade or business. Thus,
where an individual is not engaged in the business of selling know-how, the doctrine does not
apply because the individual has no everyday business operations. Similarly, where a com-
pany casually sells know-how unrelated to the everyday operation of its business, the doctrine
does not apply. But set supra note 56. Moreover, in a leading case holding that know-how is
property for purposes of § 1221, the court did not apply the Corn Products doctrine to the sale
of know-how, even though it had before it a separate issue involving the doctrine. E.I. Du
Pont De Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904 (Ct. Cl. 1961). See generaly A11About
Know-How-The Tax Treatment of Unpatented Technology,, [1974] 9 STAND. FED. TAX REP.
(CCH) 8613.
79 The Financial Accounting Standards Board suggests that the following arrangements*
under which the company would be obligated to repay the partnership would be conclusive
of the company's bearing the risk:
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sence of an express agreement, however, the arrangement may come
within this prearranged-sale theory if the surrounding circumstances
suggest an implied promise to purchase.
The implied-promise theory raises an additional problem that
threatens both capital gain treatment and the research and develop-
ment deduction; whether the arrangement constitutes a disguised bor-
rowing. One could argue that if the circumstances indicate that the
partnership is certain to be repaid, it has really loaned, money to the
company to develop software. Under this reasoning, because the part-
nership does not bear the risk of the project's failing, it will not qualify
for the research and development deduction.8 0 Furthermore, if the ar-
rangement is a disguised borrowing, the partnership never acquires title
to the software or any rights to sell, and therefore will not satisfy the sale
or exchange requirement either.8 1
Whether the arrangement constitutes a disguised borrowing will
depend on the facts of each case. For example, the company may have
used preliminary research indicating a high probability of successful
software development to attract investors. Standing alone, such evi-
dence would be inconclusive because, under normal circumstances, no
rational investor seeking a profit would finance research and develop-
ment if the prospects for success were low. However, in conjunction
with other facts and circumstances such evidence may warrant the con-
clusion that the company has obligated itself to repay the partnership.
Such circumstances may include certain provisions in the agree-
ments that indicate the company's intent to repay the partnership re-
gardless of the outcome of the project. When the company's option to
purchase the software contains a minimum royalty guarantee, then the
time it takes for the minimum payments alone to exceed the value of the
entire amount invested plus interest would be significant to indicate the
company's intent to guarantee repayment within a specified period.
The circumstances may also indicate that the company will suffer a sig-
nificant loss unless it exercises its option, regardless of the success of the
project. For example, the company may have transferred to the part-
(a) The [company] guarantees, or has a contractual commitment that as-
sures, repayment of the funds provided by the other parties regardless of
the outcome of the research and development.
(b) The other parties can require the [company] to purchase their interest in
the research and development regardless of the outcome.
(c) The other parties automatically will receive debt or equity securities of
the [company] upon termination or completion of the research and devel-
opment regardless of the outcome.
FASB STATEMENT No. 68, supra note 20, at 6.
80 A finding of disguised borrowing would indicate that the company, not the partner-
ship, was bearing the risk. The partnership would lose its deduction for research and develop-
ment payments made to the company to develop the software. See supra note 14.
81 See infra notes 121-37 and accompanying text.
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nership certain base technology or other results of preliminary research
that are not only necessary for the research project, but also for the over-
all operations of the company. If the arrangement provides no way for
the company to regain use of the technology except by repurchasing it
from the partnership, the company probably intended to repay from the
beginning. In addition, if the company acts as general partner, a con-
flict of interest may arise on the basis of which the limited partners
could reasonably be expected to litigate successfully if the company did
not buy-out the partnership's interests. Finally, if the company has es-
sentially completed the project before entering into the arrangement,
one can presume that it fully intended to repay the partnership. 82
Once the company has exercised its option it is easy to overlook the
risks that both parties have undertaken, and therefore, courts should not
readily presume that a disguised borrowing exists. In the absence of
evidence of intent to repay, a court should keep in mind that the part-
nership bears the risk of failure of the project and loss of capital gain
treatment, and the company bears the risk of foregone opportunities in a
fast-paced, highly competitive market. Nevertheless, an investor
presented with an R & D limited partnership opportunity should be
wary if, for any of the above reasons, the arrangement seems to guaran-
tee a return on his investment. If the partnership's risk is not genuine
and substantial, the transaction may be treated as a disguised borrowing
resulting in the partnership losing both the research and development
deduction and capital gain treatment.
The Service may also try to characterize the R & D limited partner-
ship arrangement as a purchase of a net-profits interest in the software
developed. Indeed, the Tax Court recently accepted this theory in Estate
ofHeliwell v. Commissioner, 8 3 a case involving a movie "production serv-
ice partnership." Although the production service partnership differs
fundamentally from the R & D limited partnership,84 the net-profits-
82 See generally FASB STATEMENT No. 68, supra note 20, at 11 5-8.
83 77 T.C. 964 (1981).
84 The production service partnership developed in the motion picture industry to pro-
vide "financing for the large 'up front' costs of producing a film. . . ." Id at 983. The
partnership would provide not only capital, but also services for producing films. Because the
partnership was in the trade or business of providing production services it could deduct its
"up front" investment as a § 162 business expense. Frequently the partnership would receive
a fee "which, at least in part, would be contingent on the commercial success of the film." Id
If in reality, the partnership provided no services of its own, but hired others to perform those
services, the Service could deny the § 162 deduction because the partnership was not engaged
in a trade or business.
The R & D limited partnership, however, derives its current expense deduction from
Revenue Procedure 69-21, 1969-2 C.B. 303, rather than from § 162. Under Revenue Proce-
dure 69-21, the partnership can deduct the costs of developing software even if it is not en-
gaged in a trade or business, see supra note 13 and accompanying text, and even if it contracts
with a third party to have the software developed, see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
Despite these safeguards, however, the Service may be able to deny the partnership's claim to
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interest theory may still apply. Unfortunately, in Estate of Helliwell, the
Tax Court did not explain why it had adopted the theory. 5 Neverthe-
less, the rationale underlying the theory as applied to the R & D limited
partnership is fairly apparent. If the company is certain to exercise the
purchase option, then the partnership's ownership and sale of the
software to the company is a sham.86 The partnership's payments to the
company for development services are really payments to the company
for the right to share in the net profits of the project.
The partnership can avoid this characterization by ensuring that
both the documentation of, and circumstances surrounding, the ar-
rangement do not indicate that the company is certain to exercise the
purchase option. This same issue arises and is considered thoroughly in
analyzing whether the interim license, which allows the partnership to
satisfy the statutory holding period requirement, is a sham.87
b. Section 1221(2). Section 1221(2) excludes from capital asset
status property depreciable under section 167 and used in the taxpayer's
trade or business. 8 Section 167 allows a reasonable deduction for de-
preciation of property used in a trade or business or held for the produc-
tion of income.89 It covers both tangible9° and intangible 1 property,
provided the intangible property has a determinable useful life.
92
Know-how generally does not have a determinable useful life, and
therefore is not depreciable. The Service's position in Revenue Proce-
dure 69-21, 93 however, is that software is an intangible asset that may be
amortized over five years (or less if the taxpayer proves a shorter useful
the current expense deduction under Revenue Procedure 69-21 by attacking the entire trans-
action as a sham. See infra text accompanying notes 86-87.
85 The court devoted the body of its opinion to determining that the partnership was not
entitled to the § 162 business expense deduction. It then concluded that "as a result of the
capital furnished by [the partnership], it acquired a right to share in the profits. . . ." 77
T.C. at 991. It appears that the court reached this conclusion simply because the partner-
ship's trade or business was a sham and the production agreement provided that the partner-
ship would receive part of its fee in the form of "additional payments . . . if the proceeds
from the distribution of the films exceeded certain limits ... " Id
86 See in/ta notes 149, 157-61 and accompanying text.
87 See in/ta notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
88 I.R.C. § 1221(2) (1976) excludes from capital asset status "property, used in [the tax-
payer's] trade or business, of a character which is subject to the allowance for depreciation
provided in section 167, or real property used in his trade or business."
89 I.R.C. § 167(a) (Supp. V 1981): "There shall be allowed as a depreciation deduction
a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable allowance
for obsolescence)-(1) of property used in the trade or business, or (2) of property held for the
production of income."
90 See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-2 (1956).
91 See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1956).
92 An intangible asset has a determinable life, if "experience or other factors" indicate
that it will have a limited use. The unsupported opinion of the taxpayer in this regard is
insufficient evidence. See id
93 1969-2 C.B. 303.
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life).9 4 Further, amortizable items are generally held to be of a charac-
ter subject to depreciation under section 167.95
Software may also qualify for section 167 depreciation independent
of the Service's positon in Revenue Procedure 69-21. Obsolescence is a
primary factor used in determining the useful life of an asset96 provided
the experience of the taxpayer or of the industry as a whole supports a
finding of obsolescence. 97 Rapid technological developments that cause
software to be replaced frequently may provide the necessary evidence
to prove a determinable useful life.98
94 Id § 4.01(2), at 303.
95 Estate of Shea v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 15, 23 (1971) ("It has long been established
that an amortizable item is 'of a character subject to depreciation' as required under section
1231(b)."); Baker v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 9, 11-14 (1962) (amortizable leasehold was "prop-
erty of a character which is subject to the allowance for depreciation" within meaning of
§ 1239(b)); Fackler v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 708, 712-16 (1941) (amortizable lease was
"property of a character which is subject to the allowance for depreciation" under predecessor
to § 1221(2)), afd, 133 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1943).
96 See I.R.C. § 167(a) (Supp. V 1981); supra note 89; Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-9 (1956)
("The depreciation allowance includes an allowance for normal obsolescence which should be
taken into account to the extent that the expected useful life of property will be shortened by
reason thereof."); Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-1(b) (1956) ("Some of the factors to be considered in
determining [the useful life] are ... (2) the normal progress of the art, economic changes,
inventions, and current developments within the industry and the taxpayer's trade or business
.. .and (4) the taxpayer's policy as to repairs, renewals, and replacements."); see also Wolfe
v. Commissioner, 12 T.C.M. (CC-) 519 (1953) (where it was reasonable to believe that pat-
ents held by taxpayer would be obsolete within a few years, expected rate of obsolescence
fixed proper deduction rather than remaining life of patent).
97 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-1(b) (1956) ("If the taxpayer's experience is inadequate, the
general experience in the industry may be used until such time as the taxpayer's own experi-
ence forms an adequate basis for making the determination."); see Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-9
(1956) ("No such change will be permitted merely because in the unsupported opinion of the
taxpayer the property may become obsolete.').
98 The Service has stated that certain software "is subject to the allowance for deprecia-
tion." Ltr. Rul. 8226063. The ruling involved I.R.C. § 103(b)(6) (1976) which applies to
"property of a character subject to the allowance for depreciation." The regulations explain
that this language means "the allowance for depreciation under section 167." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.103-10(b)(1)(ii) (1972).
Although some courts have held that computer programming and servicing purchase
costs are deductible by the purchaser under § 162, and need not be capitalized, the opinions
do not mention Revenue Procedure 69-21 and make no distinction between the purchase of a
computer program and the purchase of computer programming and servicing. See First Sec.
Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1979); Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United
States, 505 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974).
In First Sec. Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1979), the court character-
ized computer software purchased by a bank in connection with a credit card service as "com-
puter programming and servicing." The court stated that it was "unable to distinguish
between the 'computer costs' involved in the Colorado Springs case [taxpayer paid a mainte-
nance fee for computer operation by a credit card company] and the amounts paid for a
'computer program' in the case before us." Id at 1052. In his dissent, Judge Duniway ex-
plains the distinction the majority is unable to make and states: "the computer program is
* a capital asset which must be amortized over its useful life." Id at 1053.
Even if one accepts the court's erroneous characterization, a further ground for distin-
guishing both the First Security and Colorado Spings cases may be that they involved banks:
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Software that is depreciable under section 167 will not be excluded
from capital asset status under section 1221(2) unless it is used in the
taxpayer's trade or business. The "factor" test used under section
1221(1) to determine whether the taxpayer is engaged in a trade or busi-
ness applies here as well. 99 Under that test, the partnership is not neces-
sarily involved in the trade or business of selling software. 00 The selling
stage, however, is only one of three stages through which the partnership
evolves.101 It is possible that one of the other stages-the research stage
or the interim license stage---could involve a trade or business in which
the partnership "uses" the software.
During the research stage, the partnership will have no trade or
business because mere contracting for research services does not consti-
tute a trade or business. 0 2 During the interim license stage, the partner-
ship's only activity will be the receipt of royalties under the license. The
legislative history of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 indicates
that "receipt of royalties does not constitute a trade or business."' 1 3 A
court may find, however, that a trade or business does exist where there
is even minimal management of property independent of the receipt of
royalties. 10 4 The R & D limited partnership's only management in-
volves keeping track of royalties, which is not an independent activity
for purposes of finding a trade or business. Thus, the software, even if
depreciable under section 167, will not be used in a trade or business
and will therefore not be within section 1221(2).
If the partnership were engaged in the trade or business of licensing
The Comptroller of the Currency who is charged by Congress with su-
pervision and regulation of national banks has ruled that expenditures by
commercial banks for the development and implementation of credit card
programs must be charged to expense rather that [sic] capital ....
.. .Although the action of the Comptroller is not determinative, it is a
factor for consideration.
Colorado Springs Nat' Bank, 505 F.2d at 1188.
99 Set supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text. Whether or not the software is used in a
trade or business does not imply actual utilization. It "means 'devoted to the trade or busi-
ness' and includes property purchased with a view to its future use in the business even
though this purpose is later thwarted by circumstances beyond the taxpayer's control."
Alamo Broadcasting Co. v. Commissioner, 15 TC. 534, 541 (1950), acq., 1951-52 C.B. 1.
100 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
101 See supra note 61.
102 See Koons v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1092, 1100-01 (1961) (taxpayer who merely en-
tered into development contract with research specialist was not engaged in trade or
business).
103 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 9, at 113. See also Union Nat'l Bank v. United States, 195
F. Supp. 382 (N.D.N.Y. 1961) (ownership of net lease property not trade or business); Grier v.
United States, 120 F. Supp. 395 (D. Conn. 1954), ajf'dper curiam, 218 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1955)
(receipt of rental income from property requiring minimal services not trade or business);
Rev. Rul. 73-522, 1973-2 C.B. 228 (ownership of net lease property in U.S. did not cause
nonresident alien to become engaged in trade or business in U.S.).
104 See Fackler v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1943) (receipt of rents from prop-
erty requiring minimal management held trade or business).
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software,10 5 and the software was depreciable under section 167, the sale
could still qualify for capital gain treatment under section 1231(b).106
To qualify as section 1231(b) property, however, software must avoid
exclusions identical to the remaining four in section 1221.107 Thus, the
only advantage gained by qualifying under section 1231 (b) is avoiding
exclusion under section 1221(2).108
c. Section 1221(3). Section 1221(3) excludes from capital asset sta-
tus property such as a copyright, or a literary, musical, or artistic com-
position for certain classes of taxpayers. 10 9 The regulations define
"property" for purposes of section 1221(3) to include "any other prop-
erty eligible for copyright protection (whether under statute or common
law)."" 0 Congress recently enacted the Computer Software Copyright
105 Battaglia and Herskovitz argue that the R & D limited partnership will be deemed to
be engaged in the trade or business of licensing the software and cite Louw v. Commissioner,
30 T.C.M. (OCH) 1421 (1971), for support. Battaglia & Herskovitz, supra note 7, at 95. The
Louw case, however, does not deal with the issue of the trade or business of licensing inven-
tions. The court held that it was the taxpayer's inventive activities involving "the making of
inventions rather than putting them to commercial use," that constituted a trade or business.
Id at 1423. This was so even though the taxpayer had "not yet received any income from the
inventions conceived by him." Id The only direct reference the court made to licensing was
that "[h]is purpose has been to sell, lease, or license the patent or design to others." Id For a
court to find that the partnership is engaged in the trade or business of licensing software the
partnership must engage in some activity beyond mere receipt of royalties. See cases cited
supra notes 103-04.
106 I.R.C. § 1231 (Supp. V 1981). Section 1231(b) (1976) provides:
(1) General Rule.-The term "property used in the trade or business" means
property used in the trade or business, of a character which is subject to the
allowance for depreciation provided in section 167, held for more than 1 year,
and real property used in the trade or business, held for more than 1 year,
which is not-
(A) property of a kind which would properly be includible in the in-
ventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year,
(B) property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in
the ordinary course of his trade or business,
(C) a copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition, a letter or
memorandum, or similar property, held by a taxpayer described in para-
graph (3) of section 1221 ....
107 I.R.C. § 1221(1), (3), (4) (1976), (5) (Supp. V 1981); supra notes 25, 26.
108 See general/( Battaglia & Herskovitz, supra note 7, at 95-96 (discussing whether sale of
software qualifies under § 1231).
109 I.R.C. § 1221(3) (1976) excludes from capital asset status:
a copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition, a letter or memo-
randum, or similar property, held by-
(A) a taxpayer whose personal efforts created such property,
(B) in the case of a letter, memorandum, or similar property, a tax-
payer for whom such property was prepared or produced, or
(C) a taxpayer in whose hands the basis of such property is deter-
mined, for purposes of determining gain from a sale or exchange, in whole
or part by reference to the basis of such property in the hands of the tax-
payer described in subparagraph (A) or (B) ....
11o Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-1(c)(1) (1975).
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Act of 1980."' The Act confirms that computer programs are appropri-
ate material for copyright protection and specifies certain limitations on
the rights of program copyright holders.' 12 Software, therefore, may be
excluded from capital asset status under section 1221(3) if the partner-
ship, as holder, comes within the other requirements of the section.
Section 1221(3)(A) excludes copyright property that the taxpayer
creates through his personal efforts." 3 A taxpayer uses personal effort
when he "affirmatively contributes to the creation of the property, or
. . . directs and guides others in the performance of such work."'
114
Mere administrative control, however, does not constitute personal ef-
fort.' 5 Software in the hands of the partnership will not be excluded
under the "personal efforts" requirement because the partnership. has
merely contracted with the company to perform the research and devel-
opment; the company creates the software and the partnership performs
no directing and guiding function." 6
Section 1221(3)(C) excludes copyright property having the same
basis in the hands of the taxpayer that it had in the hands of its crea-
tor.11 7 Thus, if the creator of a computer program gives his software to
III Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10(a), 94 Stat. 3028. For a history of the
development of computer software copyright law, see Keplinger, Computer Software-Its Nature
and Its Protection, 30 EMORY L.J. 483, 493-511 (1981).
112 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 1981) provides: "A 'computer program' is a set of state-
ments or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a
certain result." The Act places limitations on the rights of the program copyright holder:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement
for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the
making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in
the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a
machine and that it is used in no other manner, or
(2) that such a new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and
that all archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued pos-
session of the computer program should cease to be rightful.
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this sec-
tion may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy from
which such copies were prepared, only as part of the lease, sale, or other trans-
fer of all rights in the program. Adaptations so prepared may be transferred
only with the authorization of the copyright owner.
17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. V 1981).
113 See supra note 109.
14 Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-1(c)(3) (1975).
115 "[A] taxpayer, such as [a] corporate executive, who merely has administrative control
of writers, actors, or personnel and who does not substantially engage in the direction and
guidance of such persons in the performance of their work, does not create property by his
personal efforts." Id
116 By referring expressly to a corporate executive, the regulations imply that where the
taxpayer is a corporation, the actions of its officers will be imputed to it. It is reasonable to
assume the same will be true of partners in a partnership. See Battaglia & Herskovitz, supra
note 7, at 96 (discussing potential problems arising from company being construed as acting
as agent for partnership).
117 See supra note 109.
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the taxpayer, 1 8 or sells it to the taxpayer for an amount equal to his
basis,' 19 the software in the taxpayer's hands would not qualify as a cap-
ital asset. Software in the hands of the R & D limited partnership will
not be excluded under the "same basis" requirement because the part-
nership has title to the software at all times. Prior to its sale, the
software never has a basis in anyone's hands but the partnership's. Thus,
although software qualifies as copyright property, it will not be excluded
from capital asset status because the partnership, as holder, does not
meet either the "personal efforts" or "same basis" requirements of sec-
tion 1221(3).120
Because software in the hands of the partnership qualifies as section
1221 property and is not excluded under any of section 1221's subsec-
tions, it qualifies as a capital asset. To obtain long-term capital gain
treatment, however, the partnership must also satisfy both the sale or
exchange and the holding period requirements.
B. Sale or Exchange
Long-term capital gain treatment requires a "sale or exchange of a
capital asset held for more than 1 year."1 2 1 The courts and the Service
treat the sale or exchange of trade secrets, know-how, and similar in-
tangibles under the "all substantial rights" requirement of section
1235.122 To meet this requirement a sale must transfer all "substantial
118 I.R.C. § 1015(a) (1976) ("If the property was acquired by gift. . . the basis shall be
the same as it would be in the hands of the donor. . ").
119 Id § 1012 ("basis of property shall be the cost of such property").
120 Section 1221(3)(B) excludes from capital asset status a letter, memorandum, or simi-
lar property. See supra note 109. This category does not include support documentation ac-
companying the software such as flow charts, usage instructions, and operation manuals. The
copyright laws provide protection for manuals of all sorts, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. V 1981).
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known
or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or other-
wise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.
Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works ....
Id In the House Report on the Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976), the
Committee on the Judiciary stated: "The term 'literary works' does not connote any criterion
of literary merit or qualitative value: it includes catalogs, directories, and similar factual,
reference, or instructional works and compilations of data." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 54 (1976). Thus, the support documentation would be "other property eligible for
copyright protection," Treas. Reg. § 1. 1221-1 (c)(1) (1975), and the regulations dealing with a
letter or memorandum would not apply, Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-1(c)(2) (1975) (providing that
"[t]his subparagraph does not apply to. . .any property to which subparagraph (1) of this
paragraph applies" [subparagraph (1) deals with a copyrzght, a literary, musical, or artistic
composition and similar property]').
121 I.R.C. § 1222(3) (Supp. V 1981).
122 I § 1235(a) ("A transfer (other than by gift, inheritance, or devise) ofproperty con-
sisting of all substantial rights to a patent, or an undivided interest therein which includes a
part of all such rights, by any holder shall be considered the sale or exchange of a capital asset
.... ");see Kaczmarek v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 501, 504-05 (1982) ("It is settled,
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rights" of value at the time of transfer. 123 Although some of these rights
must be transferred, others may be retained depending upon the
circumstances.
In general, to transfer all substantial rights the partnership must
not:
(1) limit the transfer geographically within the country of issuance;124
(2) limit the duration of the transfer to less than the software's re-
maining life;125
(3) limit the transfer to a particular field of use; 126
(4) limit access to any of the software;127
(5) retain the right to prevent unauthorized disclosure; 128 or
however, that transfers of unpatented technology are treated for tax purposes in a manner
akin to that afforded transfers of patents."); Ofria v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 524, 535 (1981)
("[W]e will be guided by the principles developed in cases involving the transfer of patents,
which are equally applicable to payments for commercially valuable trade secrets or know-
how or data similar to patents."); Taylor-Winfield Corp. v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 205, 213
(1971) ("It is settled, however, that unpatented technology such as know-how can be the
subject of a sale and that technical data is treated for tax purposes in a manner similar to
patents."), afd, 467 F.2d 483 (6th Cir. 1972); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 928,
1012 (1970) ("In determining whether a transfer of rights in unpatented technology consti-
tutes a sale within the meaning of sections 1221 and 1231 the courts have applied the tests
developed in the cases involving transfers of patent rights.").
123 Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2Qb)(1) (1965). Courts, in determining whether a taxpayer
transferred all substantial rights look at what the taxpayer gave up and what he retained.
Mros v. Commissioner, 493 F.2d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1974). Because giving and retaining are
both aspects of the same process, the distinction may be of little analytical value except where
the transferor gives up all substantial rights divided among more than one transferee. Where
a company assigned patent rights to two companies, one receiving the right to sell and the
other receiving the right to manufacture and use, even though the taxpayer had not "given"
all substantial rights to either company, the court held that it had not "retained" any sub-
stantial rights. C.A. Norgren Co. v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 816, 821-22 (D. Colo. 1967).
A more productive approach would be to address the elements that must be transferred and
then to analyze the elements that may be retained depending upon the circumstances.
124 Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(1)(i) (1965) (" '[AII substantial rights'. . . does not include
a grant . . . [wihich is limited geographically within the country of issuance. .. 2).
125 Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(1)(ii) (1965) (" '[A]lI substantial rights' . . . does not in-
clude a grant. . . [w]hich is limited in duration by the terms of the agreement to a period less
than the remaining life of the patent. .. 21.
126 Treas. Reg. § 1.1235(b)(1)(iii) (1965) (" '[A]ll substantial rights'. does not include
a grant. . . [w]hich grants rights to the grantee, in fields of use within trades or industries,
which are less than all the rights covered by the patent, which exist and have value at the
time of the grant . . ").
127 Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(1)(iv) (1965) (" '[All1 substantial rights' . . . does not in-
clude a grant. . . [w]hich grants to the grantee less than all the claims or inventions covered
'by the patent which exist and have value at the time of the grant.').
128 Graham v. United States, 79-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) % 9274, at 86,584 (N.D. Tex.
1979) ("In the context of trade secrets, the dividing line between a sale and a mere license has
been drawn by some courts according to whether the buyer is restrained from disclosing the
secret."); E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904 (Ct. Cl. 1961):
It follows that the essential element of a trade secret which permits of
ownership and which distinguishes it from other forms of ideas is the right in
the discoverer to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the secret. No disposition
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(6) retain the right to terminate the agreement at will.1 29
Rights and interests that the partnership may retain depending
upon the circumstances include:
(1) the right to make, use, or sell; 130
of a trade secret is complete without some transfer of this right to prevent
unauthorized disclosure.
Id at 911; Glen O'Brien Movable Partition Co. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 492, 504 (1978)
("[R]estriction on [transferee's] right to dislcose... the know-how. . . indicate[d] that [the
transferor] retained a substantial right of value in such know-how."); Taylor-Winfield Corp.
v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 205, 218 (1971) ("[W]e note that [the transferee] could not disclose
any of the technical data obtained from [the transferor] without first securing the latter's
consent. Such a proscription has been considered a substantial right."), afd, 467 F.2d 483
(6th Cir. 1972); Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 455,469 (1964) (no sale
or exchange because "[i]n the instant case we do not think that [the transferor], under the
agreement, transferred to [the transferee] any right to prevent unauthorized disclosure.").
129 Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(4) (1960); see also Taylor-Winfield Corp. v. Commissioner,
57 T.C. 205, 215 (1971) (no sale or exchange where transferor "retained the right to terminate
the 1965 know-how agreement at will at the end of the 10-year period"), a f'd, 467 F.2d 483
(6th Cir. 1972); Young v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 850, 858 (1958) (no sale or exchange where
transferor "retained the right to terminate the agreement at any time following 6 months'
notice to Bell"), aJ'd, 269 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1959). But cf. Bell Intercontinental Corp. v.
United States, 381 F.2d 1004, 1021 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (no sale or exchange where either party
could terminate the agreement at the end of 10 years although "[i]n some cases . . . the
grantor's reservation of the right to cancel at his own discretion will not preclude a sale where
it appears from all the circumstances that the right so reserved has no practical value').
130 Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(3)(ii) (1960) provides that "[t]he failure to convey. . . the
right to use or to sell may or may not be substantial, depending upon the circumstances."
Compare Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 256 (1891) ("[T]he grant of an exclusive right
under the patent. . . which does not include the right to make, and the right to use, and the
right to sell, is not a grant of a title in the whole patent right . . . and is therefore only a
license.') with Rollman v. Commissioner, 244 F.2d 634, 637 (4th Cir. 1957) ("[N]either the
Tax Court nor the other courts have felt obliged in every case to apply strictly the dicta of the
Waterman decision without regard to the objective realities of the cases before them."). In
Rollman, an exclusive right to make and sell shoes amounted to complete control because the
omission of the right to use did not limit the transferee in its actual operations under the
patent. See also Lawrence v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 542, 544-45 (5th Cir. 1957) (transfer of
exclusive right to manufacture, use, and lease, but not to sell patented tool held a conveyance
of all substantial rights under patent because evidence showed such tools could only be used
by trained operators and were withheld from sale to protect reputation of device); Parke,
Davis & Co. v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 427 (1934) (right to make and use, but not to sell,
conveyed all substantial rights in patent covering machine designed to make and fill cap-
sules), acq., 14-1 C.B. 15 (1935).
The Senate Finance Committee Report on the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 discusses
the purpose of § 1235 stating:
Moreover, the Courts have recognized that an exclusive license agreement in
some instances may constitute a sale for tax purposes even where the right to
"use" the inyention has not been conveyed to the licensee, if it is shown that
such failureodid not represent the retention of a substantial right under the
patent by the licensor. It is the intention of your committee to continue this
realistiA test, whereby the entire transaction, regardless of formalities, should
be examined in its factual context to determine whether or not substantially
all rights of the owner in the patent property have been released to the trans-
feree, rather than recognizing less relevant verbal touchstones.
S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 440 (1954). Thus, failure to transfer one of these rights
where it is of little or no value will not negate the sale.
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(2) the right to prohibit sublicensing or subassignment; 13 1
(3) the right to terminate based on a condition subsequent;' 3 2
(4) legal title for the purpose of securing performance or payment; 133
and
(5) a security interest.' 34
The partnership may either sell the software for a lump sum or
grant an exclusive license. The Code provides that a patent license may
involve payments contingent upon productivity, use, or disposition of
the property and yet still qualify as a sale or exchange.' 35 The partner-
ship can therefore transfer the software under a license,'3 6 with the
transaction being treated as a sale, rather than a lease. Because the
partnership's return under the license will depend on the company's ef-
forts to exploit the software, however, it may want to retain additional
rights to protect its investment. If the partnership retains too substan-
tial a package of rights, the license will not constitute a sale or exchange.
Rights and interests which the partnership can retain without disquali-
fying the sale include, the right to terminate based on a condition subse-
131 Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(3)(i) (1960) provides that whether the transferor's retention
of an absolute right to prohibit sublicensing or subassignment by the transferee is a substan-
tial right depends upon the circumstances. Courts, however, have generally not found such a
right to be substantial. Compare Schmitt v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 301, 307 (9th Cir. 1959)
(no sale of all substantial rights where transferor retained an unlimited veto on approval of
sublicenses) with Rollman v. Commissioner, 244 F.2d 634, 639-40 (4th Cir. 1957):
The authorities do not support the view that the grant of exclusive rights
under a patent does not amount to a transfer of a capital asset if the assignee
cannot grant a sublicense without the assignor's consent. Such a limitation
does not interfere with the full use of the patent by the assignee and it serves
to protect both parties to the assignment in case the purchase price is paid in
installments.
and Bell Intercontinental Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 1004, 1016-17 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (sale of
all substantial rights where transferee could not sublicense) and Glen O'Brien Movable Parti-
tion Co. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 492, 501 (1978) (sale of all substantial rights where trans-
feree could not assign its rights).
132 See Bell Intercontinental Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 1004, 1018-19 (Ct. Cl.
1967);see also First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 818, 822-23 (D.N.J. 1955) (sale,
not license, despite provision for cancelation of agreement upon issuance of cease and desist
order by FTC that prevents or seriously curtails sale of invention); Lamar v. Granger, 99 F.
Supp. 17, 37-38 (W.D. Pa. 1951) (sale, despite provision for termination of agreement upon
transferee's insolvency); Kronner v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 730, 733-34 (Ct. Cl. 1953)
(sale, despite provision for termination of agreement for failure to use reasonable or best ef-
forts in promoting and marketing products produced with transferred know-how); Coplan v.
Commissioner, 28 T.C. 1189 (1957), acq., 1958-2 C.B. 4 (same as Lamar).
133 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(2)(i) (1960).
134 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(2)(ii) (1957).
135 The transfer will be treated as a sale or exchange "regardless of whether or not pay-
ments in consideration of such transfer are-(1) payable periodically over a period generally
coterminous with the transferee's use of the patent, or (2) contingent on the productivity, use,
or disposition of the property transferred." I.R.C. § 1235(a)(2) (Supp. V 1981); see also Treas.
Reg. § 1.1235-1(a)(2) (1960).
136 Part of the royalty payments received under the license may be characterized as inter-
est that will be taxable as ordinary income. I.R.C. § 483 (1976) interest on certain deferred
payments).
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quent, legal title, and a security interest. 137 The partnership can thus
satisfy the sale or exchange requirement regardless of whether it licenses
the software or sells it outright.
C. The Holding Period
To obtain long-term capital gain treatment, the software must be
held for more than one year before it is sold. 138 As with the sale or
exchange requirement, courts have analogized know-how to patented
inventions to determine when the holding period begins. 3 9 For pat-
ented inventions, the holding period begins when the invention is "re-
duced to practice."' 14 An invention is reduced to practice when it has
been tested and operated under operating conditions. 14 1 The tests need
not demonstrate that the invention is ready to be manufactured com-
mercially; they merely must establish that the invention works and is
suitable for its intended purpose.142 In some cases, software's reduction
to practice can be delineated by completion of the final phase in its
development 143-- the debugging process. Debugging is a process by
137 See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
138 I.R.C. § 1222(3) (Supp. V 1981).
139 See, e.g., United States Mineral Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 177, 196-97
(1969) (holding period test for patents applied to industrial knowledge and secret processes).
140 I.R.C. § 1235(b)(2) (1976);see Simon v. Commissioner, 20T.C.M. (CCH) 1309, 1312-
13 (1961) (inventor has acquired no property rights when further application of others' "crea-
tive skill and knowledge" is necessary); Myers v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 258, 265 (1946) (tax-
payer proved completed conception of invention "by drawings made, signed, and dated by
him, which drawings set forth the invention in sufficient detail to enable those skilled in the
art to manufacture the invention ... without further application of the inventive act"); see
also Burde v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 252, 269 (1964) ("[Because] [w]e have previously de-
cided that the transfer ... did not qualify under section 1235 ... for long-term capital gains
treatment ... [the transferor] must have held property rights in the invention for [the statu-
tory holding period] prior to its sale.'), aj'd, 352 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1965).
141 Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(e) (1957).
142 Wiesner v. Weigert, 666 F.2d 582, 588 (C.C.P.A. 1981) ("It is well established that
... an invention is not reduced to practice until its practicability or utility is demonstrated
pursuant to its intended purpose, . . . though reduction to practice of a commercially salea-
ble product is not required.') (citations omitted); Randolph v. Shoberg, 590 F.2d 923, 926
(C.C.P.A. 1979) ("To prove a reduction to practice, all that must be shown is that the inven-
tion is suitable for its intended purpose. There is no requirement for a reduction to practice
that the invention, when tested, be in a commercially satisfactory stage of development.')
(citations omitted) (quoting In re Dardick, 496 F.2d 1234, 1238 (C.C.P.A. 1974)); Steinberg v.
Seitz, 517 F.2d 1359 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (same); Peeler v. Miller, 535 F.2d 647, 651 (C.C.P.A.
1976); Cochran v. Kresack, 530 F.2d 385, 391 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
143 The various stages of software development are as follows:
(1) A systems analyst defines the needs of the user (current manual
methods are examined).
(2) The analyst details a description of the proposed computerized pro-
cess.
(3) The analyst or programmer outlines the proposed processes in a gen-
eral computer program format (a flowchart may be drawn).
(4) The programmer translates the general program steps into a high-
level language such as FORTRAN or COBOL. When this translation is
584
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which programmers test software for errors. If debugging reveals no, or
only a few, significant errors, the partnership could record and later sub-
stantiate the event as the software's reduction to practice. Prior to that
time, however, or if debugging exposes many significant errors, the part-
nership would not know whether the program could perform as
intended. 144
Another problem may arise if software is improved after it has been
initially reduced to practice. In Computer Sciences Corp. v. Commissioner, 145
the court considered whether improvements made in a tax computation
program were production of property within the meaning of section
341146 and concluded that because "[i]t is customary for changes and
improvements to be made continuously on any process . . . no process
or patent developed by a taxpayer would be considered to have passed
the stage of production at any time if we considered these improvements
keypunched or typed, it becomes machine readable "source" code. The code
resides on magnetic disk, magnetic tape, or cards.
(5) The central processing unit translates this code through the use of
another piece of software-the compiler-into "object" code which more
closely corresponds with the machine's architecture for efficient processing.
This object code is stored and after extensive testing becomes the salable
product.
Comment, supra note 27, at 860 n.4.
In Computer Sciences Corp. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 327 (1974), the court applied the
"actual reduction to practice" test to determine whether a computer program had been "pro-
duced" within the meaning of§ 341 (relating to collapsible corporations). Id at 352-55. The
court stated that
[it is] not necessary that testing [proceed] to the point where the inven-
tion [is] actually ready to be put into commercial production without further
testing for reduction to practice to have occurred, but rather----"that the tests
should suffice to persuade practical men to take the risk of commercializing
the invention. . . . In the nature of things, testing goes on throughout the
process of 'commercializing' and often continues after a product is on the
market where it usually receives its severest test."
Id at 352-53 (emphasis in original) (quoting Goodrich v. Harmsen, 442 F.2d 377, 377-83
(C.C.P.A. 1971)).
The Goodrich case implies that the company would have to complete testing of the pro-
gram before it could consider the program "reduced to practice." "Practical men" would not
be likely "to take the risk of commercializing" a computer program that had not been shown
to be free of significant errors.
144 The partnership could argue in certain cases, that sometime prior to or during actual
debugging, the company had become reasonably certain that the program was viable and
that any remaining errors could be corrected easily. In such a case, the program has actually
been reduced to practice before debugging is complete and, thus, the holding period should
begin earlier. See generally Battaglia & Herskovitz, supra note 7, at 96:
When property, particularly software, has been "reduced to practice" has not
been clearly defined and there is no clear cut line of demarcation as to when
this point has been reached. Therefore, in structuring the software R&D pro-
gram, the purchase option should provide that it cannot be exercised for at
least 12 months after the property has been reduced to practice, and probably
as much as 14 to 18 months after the property has been reduced to practice in
order to provide a cushion for the holding period.
145 63 T.C. 327 (1974).
146 I.R.C. § 341 (1976, Supp. V 1981 & West Supp. 1983).
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as part of the production of property."' 14 7 The improvements made in-
cluded updating the program to comply with current tax law.' 48 Ar-
guably, more substantial changes could alter the character of the
software sufficiently to require the taxpayer to start the holding period
over again.
The holding period of know-how ends when the know-how is sold
or exchanged. Thus, in the R & D limited partnership arrangement, the
interim license agreement is designed to allow the partnership to satisfy
the one-year holding period requirement and yet still allow the corpora-
tion to use the software. Although a taxpayer may deliberately set up a
transaction so that disposition of his capital asset does not occur until
after the statutory holding period, a transaction without substance,
designed merely to convert short-term into long-term gain, will be disre-
garded as a sham.' 49 Thus, to determine whether the partnership has
satisfied the holding period requirement, one must look beyond the form
of the interim license and examine its economic substance. If the in-
terim license lacks economic substance, the sale will be treated as having
occurred on the date the license began and the partnership will not
qualify for long-term capital gain treatment.
A transfer of software by the partnership under an interm license
that expires before the end of the software's useful life normally will not
constitute a sale or exchange.' 50 When coupled with an option to
purchase, however, the license may be interpreted as transferring all
substantial rights and thus qualify as a sale. 15 1 To avoid such an inter-
pretation, the partnership must retain substantial rights in the software
beyond a reversionary interest.152 Retaining a combination of the rights
that normally must be transferred would suffice. For example, the part-
nership could restrict the interim license to a specific geographic area or
a specific field of use, and withhold the right to prevent unauthorized
147 63 T.C. at 349-50; see also supra note 143.
148 The evidence shows that additional schedules of the Federal returns and addi--
tional State returns have been added to the program yearly to the time of the
trial of this case. However, in our view, this does not require a conclusion that
the computer program, which is the property with which we are concerned
here, had not been completely developed or produced prior to mid-April of
1965.
63 T.C. at 349.
149 See, e.g., Martin v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 731, 739-43 (1965) (lease-option agreement
was in effect a sale terminating seller's holding period), modjied on other grounds, 379 F.2d 282
(6th Cir. 1967); Merrill v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 66, 75-77 (1963) (escrow agreement consti-
tuted sale terminating seller's holding period), afdper curiarn, 336 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1964);
Rev. Rul. 72-252, 1972-1 C.B. 193 (Service's position on effect of escrow agreements on hold-
ing period).
150 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(1)(ii) (1957); supra note 125.
151 Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(2) (1957) (retention of legal title by transferor may not al-
ways be considered retention of a substantial right). See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying
text.
152 See supra notes 124-34 and accompanying text.
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disclosure. The conflicting interests and particular needs of the partner-
ship and company will dictate which rights the partnership retains.
Delaying transfer of title until the company exercises the option to
purchase may not prevent the finding of an earlier sale. 153 Even if the
partnership retains certain rights, a court may treat the license as a sale
if it transfers to the company substantially all of the benefits and bur-
dens of ownership and there is no logical or economic reason for the
company not to exercise the option. 154 Whether substantially all the
benefits and burdens of ownership pass under the interim license is a
question of fact. 155 The regulations, however, specify that certain rights
will be treated as substantial in all cases.' 56 Retention of these rights
should preclude a finding that the benefits and burdens of ownership
pass during the license period.
On the other hand, there would be no logical or economic reason
for the company not to exercise the option if, for example, the company
makes substantial expenditures for production or marketing of the
software before the partnership grants the interim license, the partner-
ship requires no lump sum payment on exercise of the option, the part-
nership makes royalty payments contingent upon use without a
minimum royalty requirement, or the partnership does not require the
company to use "best efforts" to market or produce the software. Even
153 Swigart v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 1215 (1980):
It is well settled that whether an agreement is regarded as a sale or a
lease for Federal tax purposes is determined by the substance of the transac-
tion and not the terminology employed. The intent of the parties when the
agreement was executed, as ascertained from the practical effect of the agree-
ment and all the attendant facts and circumstances, is controlling.
Id at 1218; see also supra note 149.
154 See Major Realty Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 373, 381
(1981) ("Among the factors to be considered in determining when a sale is complete are the
transfer of legal title and the shift of the benefits and burdens of ownership of the property.
Generally, a sale is completed upon the first of these events to occur.") (citations omitted);
Kindschi v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 638, 646 (1979) ("[W]here passage of title is
delayed. . . sale will be complete upon the acquisition of the burdens and benefits of owner-
ship by the purchaser."); Baird v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 115, 126 (1977); Deyoe v. Commis-
sioner, 66 T.C. 904, 910 (1976); Lisle v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 627, 635 (1976)
("[A] sale for tax purposes . . . occurs upon a passing of sufficient incidents of beneficial
ownership . . . .'); Martin v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 731, 742 (1965) (option to purchase
constituted sale when granted because "[t]here was no logical or economic reason for the
[optionee] not to exercise the option. . . .'), modified on other groun, 379 F.2d 282 (6th Cir.
1967); Merrill v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 66, 74 (1963) ("[T]he intent of the parties as to when
the benefits and burdens of ownership of the property are to be transferred, as evidenced by
factors other than passage of bare legal title, must control ... "), aJ'dper cn'am, 336 F.2d
771 (9th Cir. 1964).
155 See Major Realty Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 373, 381
(1981) ("The question of when a sale is complete for Federal income tax purposes is essen-
tially a question of fact to be resolved by a consideration of all the surrounding facts and
circumstances."); Kindschi v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 638, 646 (1979) ("The ques-
tion of when a sale is complete is essentially a question of fact.').
156 See supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
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if these factors do not exist when the partnership grants the option, if
they arise at any time substantially before the exercise date, a sale may
be deemed to occur at that time. Thus, if the company does not need a
year to evaluate the software, the sale may be held to date from the time
the company decides to purchase. After that time, the company argua-
bly has no logical or economic reason not to exercise the option. This
argument fails, however, for two reasons.
First, the company does have a logical and economic reason not to
exercise before one year. The extra time allows the company to analyze
the impact of competing products entering the market in deciding
whether or not to exercise the option. Second, an optionee who accepts
an option not exercisable until a fixed date may well want to exercise
before the exercise date. The future date represents a trade-off between
the competing interests of the two parties, not one party's ideal solution.
To assume that the exercise date is the precise date that each party
would choose on its own is unrealistic. To invalidate an option of this
sort by looking at only one of the parties' interests ignores commercial
reality. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, one should presume
that the option reflects a balance of both parties' interests.
A problem may arise, however, if the only reason for making the
interim license period one year is to allow the partnership to fulfill the
holding period requirement. A court could disregard such a license as a
sham. 157 The interim license, however, results from arm's length bar-
gaining between the parties and not solely from the partnership's desire
to obtain long-term capital gain treatment. The interim license, there-
fore, should not be disregarded. 158 The partnership bears the risk of
failure of the development project and the potential loss of capital gain
treatment 159 in exchange for a one-year interim license that ensures
long-term capital gain treatment in the event the company exercises its
157 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
158 "[A] transaction, otherwise within an exception of the tax law, does not lose its immu-
nity, because it is actuated by a desire to avoid. . . taxation." Gregory v. Helvering, 69 F.2d
809, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1934), af'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
In Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978), a case involving a sale-lease-
back arrangement the Court held:
[W]here. . . there is a genuine multiple-party transaction with economic
substance which is compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory reali-
ties, is imbued with tax-independent considerations, and is not shaped solely
by tax-avoidance features that have meaningless labels attached, the Govern-
ment should honor the allocation of rights and duties effectuated by the
parties.
Id at 583-84. But see Gunn, Tax Avoidance, 76 MICH. L. REV. 733 (1978) (arguing that
whether particular conduct was tax motivated should be irrelevant to whether conduct is
taxed in certain way).
159 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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option. 60 One could argue that the partnership could just as easily off-
set its risk by requiring a higher royalty percentage. This argument,
however, assumes that the parties can negotiate a percentage that per-
fectly reflects the value that each assigns to its risk, independent of tax
considerations. In fact, the company probably will not be willing to
raise the percefltage because it presumes that the partnership can offset
part of its risk through possible capital gain treatment. As a result, the
arm's length bargaining may force the partnership to structure the
transaction to obtain long-term capital gain treatment to cover the
value of its risk.
Nevertheless, a court may still ignore the interim license as a sham
if it believes that Congress did not intend to allow taxpayers to use the
holding period in this manner. The holding period requirement distin-
guishes between gains from investment and speculation.' 6 ' This pur-
pose is served fully by the one-year rule. Gains from investment and
speculation are better distinguished on the basis of length of time held,
than on the basis of motive.
One can argue, however, that a further purpose of the holding pe-
riod requirement is to ensure that ordinary income-type items that "slip
through the capital asset net" do not receive favorable capital gain
treatment unless they are held long enough to generate income from
appreciation in value. Assuming that software in the hands of the part-
nership is the type of property that has managed to "slip through," it
can fulfill this purpose provided the terms of the purchase and sale op-
tion remain flexible enough to allow the parties to negotiate a lump-sum
price or royalty percentage at the end of the interim license period. If
the sale price is set at the time the parties enter into the research and
development contract, the partnership cannot realize any appreciation
during the one-year holding period. Further, if the anticipated apprecia-
tion is "built into" the price, the risk element associated with investment
does not exist. A royalty percentage rate determined ahead of time,
however, does reflect appreciation in value; the more valuable the
software, the higher the payment the set percentage will produce. Nev-
ertheless, the partnership would be well advised in this regard to keep
the price term open until the purchase and sale option is exercised.
The interim license can satisfy both the formal requirement of the
holding period and its underlying policy. In doing so, however, it may
retard rather than promote software development. Similar products en-
160 Of course, if the facts and circumstances indicate that the parties did not deal at arm's
length, the results would be quite different.
161 See Chabrow, Capital Gains: Should the Holding Peiod Be Extended, 113 TR. & EsT. 196,
199 (1974) ("It was the intent of Congress in establishing a holding period, as far back as the
Revenue Act of 1921, to provide different tax treatment for capital gains resulting from in-
vestment as distinguished from those gains resulting from speculation.").
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tering the market during the one-year interim license period could have
the effect of reducing an investor's return. If the company decides not to
purchase, the partnership would be forced to find another buyer in a
competitive market and would probably be denied capital gain treat-
ment. 162 If the company did decide to purchase the software, the part-
nership would receive smaller royalties based on the company's reduced
market share. Further, it is possible that software marketed under a re-
stricted license, if not developed by someone else, would deprive a part
of society of a valuable resource for a time.
These arguments, however, overlook the flexibility of the sale or
exchange requirement. The company can develop a significant market
during the interim license period even though the partnership retains
substantial rights in the software. 163 Few companies would expend time
to develop software that they knew they would be unable to exploit suf-
ficiently. Ultimately, it may be the free enterprise system that upholds
the integrity of the arrangement. Faced with a potential loss of market
share because of an overly restrictive interim license, the parties may
agree to an earlier sale, sacrificing capital gain treatment for higher roy-
alties at ordinary income rates.
CONCLUSION
A sale of computer software by an R & D limited partnership, if
structured properly, should satisfy the requirements of the capital gain
provisions. Software in the hands of the partnership qualifies as a capi-
tal asset and its sale by the partnership can satisfy both the sale or ex-
change and holding period requirements. The greatest barriers to
capital gain treatment arise from the circumstances surrounding the ar-
rangement. If the company obligates itself to purchase the software, or
guarantees the partnership a return on investment from the start, the
entire transaction may constitute a disguised borrowing or a purchase of
a net-profits interest, or the interim license may be disregarded as a
sham. Investors, alert to the issues raised in this Note, can avoid such
pitfalls by carefully investigating the proposed deal before investing in
the partnership.
The R & D limited partnership arrangement promotes the develop-
ment of software. Companies can use it to attract software financing
based on tax benefits afforded by Revenue Procedure 69-21 and the
long-term capital gain provisions. Further, given our society's need to
develop means for processing information quickly and efficiently, grant-
162 The partnership's marketing activities could constitute a "trade or business" thereby
excluding the software from capital asset status under § 1221. See supra note 60.
163 See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text; text accompanying note 137.
[Vol. 68:554
1983] SALE OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE 591
ing tax advantages to those who invest in software development is a
worthwhile price to pay for progress.
Peter T Beach
